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ABSTRACT 
SPILLOVER EFFECTS OF THE UNINSURED 
Stacey McMorrow 
Mark V. Pauly 
This study seeks to determine the effects of the local uninsurance rate on the quality of 
care delivered to Medicare beneficiaries.  While a great deal of research exists on the 
negative consequences of uninsurance for the uninsured, few studies have attempted to 
address the spillover effects of this population to the health care system in a local market.  
Theory suggests that a high local uninsurance rate in a market has the potential to cause a 
decrease in the shared quality of care provided to Medicare beneficiaries.  It also suggests 
however that a higher uninsurance rate may result in increases in access to care by 
Medicare beneficiaries as well as improvements in the unique quality provided to these 
individuals.  The implications of a high uninsurance rate on outcomes are therefore 
ambiguous.  These concepts are tested using data on hospitals and Medicare beneficiaries 
in 100 large MSAs.  The effects on outcomes of care are examined by exploring the 
relationship between local uninsurance rates and mortality from a variety of specific 
conditions.  The results are mixed.  In smaller markets, the spillover effects of the 
uninsured are more likely to be negative.  In larger markets however, the effects are more 
likely to be positive.  The mechanisms behind these results are examined by looking at 
the effects on shared and unique quality.  The effects on shared quality are tested by 
examining the availability of specialized hospital services in markets with varying levels 
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of uninsurance.  The results show that hospitals in markets with high levels of 
uninsurance provide fewer unprofitable services.  The effects on unique quality and 
access are tested by examining the relationship between local uninsurance rates and 
utilization by Medicare beneficiaries.  The results exhibit weak evidence that Medicare 
beneficiaries in areas with higher uninsurance rates use more care.   The study concludes 
that while local uninsurance rates do not appear to have strong negative consequences for 
Medicare beneficiaries, spillover effects at the market level do exist and warrant further 
exploration.  In controlling for Medicaid rates in the models, stronger relationships are 
evident between Medicaid and Medicare which may be an important avenue for future 
research. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction and Literature Review 
 
Introduction 
Among the many concerns regarding the state of the US healthcare system, most 
can be classified as relating broadly to issues of cost, quality or access.  The three are 
inextricably linked and make up what has often been referred to as the iron triangle of 
healthcare.  For at least 15 years, the issue of access, and more specifically the lack of 
access attributed to a growing number of uninsured individuals, has been at the forefront 
of health services research.  With the number of uninsured individuals currently at 47 
million and growing, this population continues to garner a lot of attention from academics 
and politicians alike.  Research on the uninsured has generally focused on the correlates 
and likely causes of uninsurance as well as on the effect of being uninsured on health, 
health care access, utilization and expenditures of the uninsured.  It has been well 
established that low-income, non-white, less educated, and younger people are more 
likely to be uninsured.  Uninsured individuals use less preventive care and, after 
frequently later diagnosis, use less treatment than their insured counterparts.  Evidence of 
higher mortality rates for the uninsured also exists.  The health effects of uninsurance 
often result in economic effects as well.  Lower labor force participation and lower 
earnings are both correlated with a lack of coverage.  A good review of this literature can 
be found in Hadley (2003).   
At the individual-level therefore, the conclusions are relatively clear.  
Uninsurance results in a lack of access to care which can result in poor outcomes as well 
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as costly financial consequences for the affected individuals.  At the market-level, 
however the impact of a large uninsured population is less obvious.  While the uninsured 
themselves will likely face the negative repercussions detailed above, the insured 
population may also experience some spillover effects of a high uninsurance rate.  Low 
demand by uninsured individuals may change the incentives for providers to offer a 
particular service or alter the distribution of services across patients with various types of 
coverage.  High uncompensated care costs for the uninsured may also put financial 
pressure on providers and ultimately result in cost or quality spillovers in the market as a 
whole.  In a multi-payer system such as that in the US, the entire distribution of insurance 
coverage will be important in determining the equilibrium levels of access, cost and 
quality available to all individuals.  A variety of potential spillover effects to insured 
members of the community are therefore possible and have thus far been largely 
neglected in previous studies on the consequences of uninsurance.   
The purpose of this work is to explore the potential spillover effects of the 
uninsured.  It will focus specifically on the spillover effects to Medicare beneficiaries and 
will examine the effect of the local uninsurance rate on measures of access to hospital 
services, inpatient utilization and health outcomes.  The analysis will also attempt to 
determine the market-level conditions that may reduce or enhance the likelihood of 
spillover effects.  The policy implications of this work are among its most important 
contributions.  In considering any number of proposals to cover the uninsured, it is often 
accepted that any intervention will come at a large financial cost and possibly at a cost to 
the quality of care delivered to insured individuals.  This is the iron triangle logic; access 
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cannot be enhanced without sacrificing quality or affordability.  These arguments 
however do not typically account for the impact that the uninsured are already having on 
the market as a whole in terms of access, quality and cost spillovers to the insured.  This 
study seeks to bring some of these spillovers to light in order to allow for a better 
weighing of the costs and benefits of reform.   
The results of this work will be especially relevant to recent reform proposals that 
include mandating coverage for all individuals.  Mandates can be politically unpopular, 
but their supporters have responded by pointing to insurance mandates in other sectors 
that are widely accepted.  Commonly mandated insurance, such as automobile liability 
coverage, however, is generally not mandated to protect the insured, but to protect 
potential „victims‟ of the insured.  Collision insurance, on the other hand, which 
reimburses an individual for losses to their own property when they are at fault, is not 
mandated.  This indicates that the case for mandating health insurance would be made 
stronger by providing evidence that the uninsured not only face the negative 
consequences of their own lack of coverage, but impose negative externalities on their 
insured neighbors.  This study seeks to determine whether such externalities exist. 
 
Literature Review 
Effect of insurance on access, utilization and outcomes 
As already noted, the effect of insurance on individual access, utilization and 
outcomes has been clearly demonstrated in many previous studies.  Studies range from 
the RAND health insurance experiment to evaluations of changes in Medicare policy and 
the impact of managed care (Manning, et al. 1987, Sloan, et al. 1988, Miller and Luft, 
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1997).  The overwhelming conclusion from all of this work however, is that the 
incentives created by insurance have a pronounced impact on the behavior of both 
consumers and providers.   
Effect of market-level characteristics holding insurance status constant 
In addition to studies that investigate the effects of insurance on access, utilization 
and outcomes, there is an equally important volume of work on how the delivery of 
healthcare varies across market areas.  Such studies often focus on the Medicare 
population in order to hold insurance constant across areas and investigate how market-
level characteristics impact the access, utilization or costs in the market.  Market-level 
factors may change the incentives of providers to choose certain types of care and will 
thus have a tendency to affect all individuals in the market, regardless of their insurance 
status.  Socioeconomic factors, for instance, including the racial composition of an area 
or its income level, can have independent effects above and beyond the sum of the effects 
of the race and income of individuals in the area (Subramanian and Kawachi 2004).  
Additional health care market characteristics have also been shown to affect the delivery 
of care including the competitive structure of the hospital market (Dranove, et al. 1992, 
Kessler and Geppert, 2005).   
A similar category of work has focused on the regional variations in spending and 
utilization that remain after controlling for the individual characteristics of the patients in 
the market and other market-level characteristics.  This work was initiated by researchers 
at Dartmouth but has inspired a large component of literature in its wake.  The initial 
results found wide variation in spending across areas that could not be adequately 
explained by individual characteristics of patients or prices (Fisher, et al. 2003).  Further 
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research in this area has attributed much of the variation to the presence of health care 
capacity in the form of medical specialists and hospital beds including ICU beds and 
other high intensity services (Baicker and Chandra 2004).   
Insurance variation across areas and over time 
Independently of the work on regional variations in spending, additional studies 
have explored the extent of variation in health insurance coverage across areas and over 
time.  The insurance distribution varies widely across areas, specifically the proportions 
uninsured, with Medicaid and with managed care coverage (Cunningham and Ginsburg 
2001, Dranove, et al. 1998).  This variation has not been incorporated into the Dartmouth 
work or other studies on market-level effects in any attempt to explain the regional 
variations in care. 
Insurance spillover effects 
A substantial amount of work has focused directly on the types of market-level 
insurance spillover effects being suggested here.  These studies legitimize the concept of 
insurance spillover effects and provide some initial modeling ideas.  Finkelstein (2007) 
estimates the aggregate impact of the introduction of the Medicare program on hospital 
expenditures.  She finds that expenditures are six times greater than what aggregating the 
individual effects of the program would have predicted.  This study suggests that there 
are market-level effects of insurance changes which may occur through an improved 
ability to finance fixed cost investments or through more general changes in practice 
patterns.   
A more commonly examined spillover effect of insurance has been that of 
managed care on other insured populations.  Several studies have explored the effect of 
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managed care penetration on expenditures, outcomes and utilization of Medicare 
beneficiaries.   Shen (2003) studies the impact of HMO penetration on the quality of care 
delivered to Medicare beneficiaries with acute myocardial infarction (AMI).  She finds 
that increases in HMO penetration at the market level adversely affect outcomes, as 
measured by mortality rates and other medical complications.  Bundorf and others (2004) 
also examine the effects of market level HMO penetration on treatments for AMI.  They 
find that utilization of certain treatments declines with increased managed care activity.  
Baker measures the impact of HMO penetration on Medicare fee-for-service health 
expenditures (Baker 1997, 1999).  His work shows that increased HMO penetration in a 
market does have spillover effects in reducing the expenditures of Medicare beneficiaries.  
All of these studies indicate further that the influence of insurance in the health care 
market can go beyond its immediate impact on those it covers. 
A small body of work has recently developed on the spillover effects of the 
uninsured more specifically.  In A Shared Destiny, the Institute of Medicine (IOM) 
begins to address the issue of the community effects of uninsurance.  The findings 
suggest a number of ways that communities with higher rates of uninsurance may face 
access, cost or quality concerns.  The main conceptual argument made by the IOM is that 
the uninsured affect local health care markets through the financial burden of 
uncompensated care.  The burden of uncompensated care is expected to curb access by 
forcing providers to reduce hours, cut back on services provided, or even relocate.  Such 
effects may be felt by the insured, as well as the uninsured, when both groups share the 
same providers.  Cost spillovers are also suggested.  The cost of providing 
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uncompensated care may be shifted to those with insurance through higher charges and 
higher insurance premiums or through tax increases.  Strikingly, the IOM report has little 
to say about the potential impact of the uninsured on quality or outcomes for insured 
individuals.  The only such references are to possible cutbacks in nursing staff due to 
financial pressures or effects on emergency departments due to overcrowding (IOM 
p.118).   
Several additional studies address the effects of community uninsurance on access 
to care, but generally summarize the effects as community averages.  This necessarily 
reflects the impact on the uninsured and does not specifically address the issue of 
spillovers to the insured.  These studies also tend to use subjective measures of unmet 
need and focus on how higher uninsurance rates can enhance access problems for the 
uninsured (Cunningham and Kemper 1998, Andersen et al. 2002, Brown et al. 2000).  
More recent work by Pagan and Pauly (2006, 2007) extends this approach.  They 
examine the effect of local uninsurance rates on a measure of unmet need for insured and 
uninsured individuals, separately.  They find that insured, but not uninsured, individuals 
in communities with higher levels of uninsurance have more trouble accessing care than 
those in communities with lower levels.  They also find that, in areas with higher levels 
of uninsurance, perceived quality of care by both doctors and consumers is lower.  The 
disaggregated approach of examining separate effects on the insured is an important 
extension and will be pursued further in this study.   
Contribution 
With the aforementioned literature in mind, this study investigates the effects of 
the local insurance distribution on the quality of care delivered in the health care market.  
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The analysis focuses on the impact of local uninsurance rates on the availability of 
hospital services and on the utilization and outcomes of care for Medicare beneficiaries.  
The Medicare population is chosen because data access is obtainable and because it will 
minimize the need to control for individual insurance coverage across markets.  It is also 
consistent with much of the previous work on spillover effects of managed care as well as 
the work on geographic variations in care.  Furthermore, with access to multiple years of 
data, this study supplements the cross-sectional results with additional analyses to further 
explore the questions of interest.  
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Chapter 2: Conceptual Framework 
 
One of the weaknesses of the earlier work on spillover effects is a lack of a 
coherent theoretical framework as to how these effects might arise.  This results in 
difficulty in generating clear testable hypotheses regarding the impact of uninsurance 
rates on Medicare quality.  Initial intuition suggests that facing a large proportion of less 
generously insured patients may result in poorer quality and spillover effects to insured 
patients.  Further reflection however reveals several complex ways in which a high 
uninsurance rate may affect the delivery of care to insured individuals, not all of them 
negative.  The mechanism(s) by which these potential spillover effects arise and what 
causes them to be more or less prominent has not been made clear.  This chapter 
summarizes the concepts that have been suggested in the previous literature and presents 
a more complete conceptual framework to guide future work on spillovers.  The 
framework also focuses specifically on how the uninsured generate spillover effects to 
Medicare beneficiaries.   
This chapter describes several ways in which the uninsured might influence 
quality for Medicare beneficiaries.  It relies on a variety of literature on provider choice 
of price and quality as well as some work on product differentiation to provide a 
theoretical background.  Each applicable theory paints a slightly more complex picture of 
the relationship between the insurance distribution and the level and distribution of 
quality available in the market.  A formal model would be exceedingly complex and 
unlikely to generate a clear and consistent set of hypotheses.  A descriptive story will be 
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generated based on the applicable theory and used to further illustrate the potential 
impact of the uninsured on Medicare beneficiaries specifically.  A set of hypotheses 
based on the applicable theory and the descriptive story rounds out the chapter.  The 
question however is ultimately an empirical one as to how the uninsured affect the quality 
of care delivered to Medicare beneficiaries.     
Theoretical Background 
Several previous studies consider the issue of how providers choose price and 
quality in response to consumer demand.  Some explicitly consider the role of insurance 
in the provider‟s decision process while others are less explicit, but allow for similar 
interpretations.  Each study presented here includes an important element in predicting 
the existence of spillover effects.   
Single price and quality 
In one of the simpler cases, Dranove and Satterthwaite (1992) consider a producer 
in monopolistic competition choosing price and quality when both are imperfectly 
observable to consumers.  The producer chooses one price and one quality.  In their 
model, which is not specifically a model of healthcare provider behavior, the 
observability of an attribute is related to its elasticity of demand.  For instance, when 
price is hard to observe, demand becomes more inelastic with respect to price.  In a 
healthcare context, health insurance changes an individual‟s exposure to the true price of 
health services and therefore makes the price harder to observe.  This observation is used 
to consider the implications of this model for a healthcare provider.   
The model shows that a provider facing more elastic demand will choose a lower 
price and produce at a lower quality.  This occurs because as demand becomes more 
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sensitive to price, prices will fall which causes a reduction in the price-cost margin and 
creates the incentive to reduce quality.  The model also explores the role of elasticity of 
demand with respect to quality and finds that it has a positive impact on quality.  As 
quality becomes more observable, incentives to produce higher quality products are 
enhanced.  The authors use the example of managed care as a case in which price 
becomes easier to observe and can result in the above chain of causation to lower quality.  
This is consistent with some of the findings on the spillover effects of managed care, but 
none of these studies were motivated in precisely this way.  In summary, the model 
suggests that a high level of uninsurance (and thus price elastic demand) bolstered by the 
fact that healthcare quality is difficult to observe (and thus demand is quality inelastic) 
can result in a lower optimal quality choice.   
A similar prediction concerning price elasticity and quality choice is attributed to 
Spence (1975) who suggests that when price-cost margins are high, the profit-
maximizing response is to increase quality despite its cost, as it will attract more 
customers at a high margin.  As price-cost margins are a function of the elasticity of 
demand, this again suggests that in markets with more elastic demand, lower quality will 
be chosen, all else equal.  Both models then suggest that high uninsurance and elastic 
demand can lead to lower optimal quality choices under profit maximization.  The profit 
maximizing assumption is not required to get such a prediction however.  Newhouse 
(1970) models the behavior of a non-profit hospital seeking to maximize quantity and 
quality.  A shift in the generosity of insurance coverage resulting in a more elastic market 
demand results in a lower optimal quality in this instance as well.  Thus, based on the 
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above models, all else equal, an individual provider facing more elastic demand as a 
result of a less generously insured population will choose a lower quality. 
 The above results are important in thinking about the effect of insurance on the 
provision of quality however the models discussed assume that only one price and one 
level of quality are chosen by a provider.  In reality, providers serve patients from 
multiple payers and charge them different prices.  Different levels of quality may also be 
provided based on the individual payer.  Furthermore, providers produce multiple 
products, each with its own price and quality, which may be factored into an overall 
maximization problem.  Finally, competition with other providers in a market can affect 
the chosen prices and quality for all payers and products.   These are just a few of the 
complexities that arise in theoretically predicting the impact of a large uninsured 
population on the care delivered to insured individuals.  The remainder of this section 
reviews a series of studies that address one or more of these issues in their modeling of 
quality choice.   
Multiple prices, single quality 
 Perhaps the most important of the issues noted above is the notion that providers 
produce a unique quality for each payer.  If this were true, the opportunity for spillover 
effects would be minimal.  Each payer would receive a quality determined only by the 
incentives created by their own coverage.  Most discussions of spillover effects therefore 
acknowledge that there must be some common element to the provision of care in order 
for spillovers to occur.  Depending on the context, suggested commonalities have 
included fixed cost technologies, ethical obligations and physician practice patterns.  The 
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underlying idea is the same however in that a spillover will exist if the incentives created 
by one payer have an effect on some element of care that is shared by all payers.  If a 
provider must balance the incentives of several payers in choosing the quality of a 
common element of care, spillovers become relevant.  
If we assume that there are at least some elements of care that are provided in 
common and are influenced by multiple payers, then we would like to know how the 
distribution of coverage affects this common quality.  The Dranove-Satterthwaite model 
addresses the issue by assuming that there is one representative consumer and that one 
price is chosen.  This generates a prediction regarding the effect of the overall elasticity 
of demand on the quality chosen, but is quite unrealistic in representing a healthcare 
market.  Glazer and McGuire (2002), on the other hand, explicitly examine the effect of a 
mix of private-pay and Medicare patients on the common quality of care.  The model 
assumes that providers take the Medicare price as given and set a price for private 
patients.  The authors prove that a mix of payers will lead to a compromise by the 
provider on the common quality that is delivered.  Each set of patients receives a different 
level of quality than that which they would have received were they the only payer.  In 
this example, Medicare patients receive a higher quality and private-pay patients receive 
a lower quality than they would have as a single payer.   
      A few notable findings from the model include some interesting ramifications of 
the compromise that occurs.  In some cases, the compromise actually brings one or both 
payers closer to an efficient level of quality than they would have been as a single payer.  
Compromise also has the effect of diluting the impact of any changes by either payer 
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intended to influence quality.  In this particular example, because Medicare sets its price 
and hospitals take it as given, Medicare can take advantage of the compromise that 
occurs on quality and free-ride on the more generous private payer.  Finally, the model 
also examines the effect of the number of private pay patients on the Medicare price 
required to induce a provider to serve Medicare patients.  Fewer private-pay patients 
lower this price, effectively improving Medicare‟s access to the provider.  All of the 
above findings have implications in discussing spillover effects of the uninsured.  Most 
importantly however, the compromise on quality indicates the presence of spillover 
effects in this context and thus supports the existence of spillover effects from the 
uninsured as well.   
As opposed to Dranove-Satterthwaite, Glazer-McGuire comes a bit closer to a 
realistic picture of how providers choose a common quality.  It captures the fact that there 
are multiple payers and that each pays a separate price.  It also incorporates the unique 
fact in healthcare markets that Medicare‟s price is set in advance and taken by the 
provider.  These are great improvements, but there are still a number of concerns.  In 
generating the hospital profit function for the model, the profit derived from Medicare is 
a function of the probability that a Medicare beneficiary will choose the provider.  This 
probability is a function of the quality of the provider and is included under the 
assumption that Medicare beneficiaries are not restricted in their choice of provider.  No 
such dependence is included for the private payer under the assumption that choice is 
often restricted for these patients.  This may have important implications for extending 
this model to consider the spillover effects of the uninsured.   
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The Glazer-McGuire model also assumes that there is only one private payer, but 
does provide some insight as to how the model could be altered to include additional 
payers.  It does the same regarding the role of competition from other providers.  It does 
not explicitly model other providers, but suggests ways to interpret the effect of market 
structure on the model.  Finally, the model simplifies the choice of quality to one element 
of shared quality and seeks to determine how multiple payers affect this quality.  Of 
course, the quality of care delivered to a patient is likely to have both shared and unique 
components.  Furthermore, a provider also produces multiple products each of which may 
have shared and unique elements of quality.  The take-home message from the Dranove-
Satterthwaite and Glazer-McGuire results is that when at least some quality is shared 
across payers, the incentives of all payers will be balanced in choosing this shared quality 
which can result in spillover effects.  The role of non-shared, or unique, quality, multiple 
providers and multiple products will be discussed below.   
Multiple prices, multiple qualities 
      While the common quality delivered to all payers is influenced by the insurance 
distribution as discussed above, it is also probable that there are unique elements of 
quality provided based solely on the incentives of the individual payer.  Dor and Farley 
(1996) examine this issue by considering a multiproduct cost function.  Their theoretical 
results are interesting in that they emphasize the fact that the marginal cost of quality has 
two components; the cost of treating intra-marginal discharges more intensively and the 
cost of the additional discharges demanded as a result of a quality increase.  Empirically, 
they find that providers do vary the marginal costs, or intensity of care, to reflect the 
generosity of a specific payer after accounting for case-mix.  The authors conclude that 
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this is evidence that providers respond to financial incentives from multiple payers and 
allocate resources accordingly.  This complements the work by Glazer and McGuire 
which finds that providers respond to multiple payers in setting shared elements of 
quality by requiring some compromise.  Dor and Farley‟s results indicate that this 
compromise on shared quality may also be accompanied by adjustments to marginal costs 
for individual payers.  The first argues for a role for spillovers while the second seems to 
argue against it.   
Glied and Zivin (2002) do not present a formal model, but do explore similar 
issues and empirically try to determine of HMO penetration on shared and unique quality.  
They address the effects of managed care on physicians caring for both managed care and 
fee-for-service (FFS) patients.  They find that an increase in managed care patients can 
result in a reduction in the shared quality as measured by the length of an office visit.  All 
patients in the practice are impacted by this adjustment.  They also suggest however that 
in response to a given investment in fixed costs, or shared quality, the provider will alter 
the investment in variable costs to each payer.  For example, if the practice is dominated 
by FFS payers and thus makes a large investment in fixed costs, managed care patients 
are expected to see a reduced variable cost investment because they are getting an 
„excessive‟ fixed cost investment in proportion to their own payment.  If the practice is 
dominated by managed care patients on the other hand and a smaller fixed investment is 
made, both managed care and FFS patients may get more variable cost investment than in 
the previous scenario.  FFS patients however may get a larger increase.  This type of 
response on variable costs, or unique quality, would diminish any negative spillover 
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effects.  In response to a reduction in fixed costs, the work thus suggests an increase in 
variable costs for both payer types.  Whether these costs converge to the same level or 
diverge will depend on which group sees a higher rate of increase.   
The empirical results show that there is a reduction in the length of an office visit 
in practices with more managed care patients.  This represents a reduction in a shared 
element of quality.  They also show that both managed care and FFS patients see an 
increase in the number of prescriptions in response to an increase in managed care.  This 
is thought to reflect an increase in unique quality.  Managed care use increased faster 
indicating a convergence in variable costs.  This suggests that FFS beneficiaries are not 
receiving substantial additional investment in variable costs of quality and thus may 
experience a net negative spillover effect.  This could result from an implicit ethical 
obligation to treat all patients equally.         
Multiple providers   
At this point, we have seen evidence from Glazer and McGuire that multiple 
payers will affect a common level of quality and can thus create spillover effects between 
payers.  Their work also suggests that access for Medicare beneficiaries will increase 
with a decline in private payers.  Dor and Farley, along with Glied and Zivin, provide 
evidence that these effects may be mitigated by payer-specific changes in the unique 
elements of quality.  Glied and Zivin do suggest however that the compensation might 
not be complete and spillover effects may still occur.  It is important to note that all of 
these models generally discuss how the payer distribution at the provider-level affects the 
choices of the provider.  As has been the case in most of the previous work on spillover 
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effects however, the insurance distribution is most easily observed at the market-level.  
This market-level insurance distribution does not necessarily mirror the payer distribution 
at any individual provider in the market.  The distribution of coverage in the market may 
lead to differentiation by providers in response to the varied incentives and this 
differentiation may change the potential for spillover effects.  If all providers choose the 
same quality and compete for all of the different payers in the market, the potential for 
spillovers will remain strong within each provider.  If however, each provider caters to a 
specific portion of the preference distribution, the need to balance the incentives of the 
different payers is diminished.  This consideration of provider specialization by payer has 
been missing from previous work on spillover effects. 
Theories of product differentiation in the industrial organization literature lend 
some insight to the question of how the strategic interaction between providers affects the 
potential for spillovers.  While the models themselves require many assumptions and 
simplifications that make them inappropriate for predicting hospital behavior, the 
dominant message from the formal models of product differentiation is important.  When 
markets are large enough to support multiple providers, the extent of quality 
differentiation will be the result of a tradeoff between increasing market share (less 
differentiation) and limiting price competition (more differentiation).  The following 
discusses some of the factors that contribute to the likelihood of differentiation and how 
these might apply to markets for hospital services.  
The most dramatic case for specialization and thus against spillovers is made by 
Rosen (1974).  He shows that, in a perfectly competitive market with no economies of 
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scale and a uniform distribution of consumer preferences, all levels of a given attribute 
will be produced and the market will determine the prices such that supply and demand 
for each variant are equal.  Producers in this scenario have no market power and prices 
are entirely determined by the market.  In such a setting, there would be no spillovers 
because each desired quality would be produced and priced to equate demand and supply.  
Incentives would be perfectly aligned and all consumers would receive their preferred 
quality.  The assumptions here are unlikely to apply to a healthcare market however.  
Healthcare providers are assumed to operate in an environment more appropriately 
described as monopolistic competition where providers do have market power in setting 
prices.  Also, fixed costs will clearly limit the number of providers in the market, but the 
general insight is important.     
Many models of product differentiation, and those most applicable to the current 
work, stem from Hotelling‟s (1929) model of location choice.  A major incentive for 
variety in these models is the ability to limit price competition among close neighbors.  
This goal is traded off against the incentive to gain market share.  Several models predict 
product selection decisions with locations chosen along a horizontal, vertical, or more 
general characteristics space.  The simplest models of product selection are those of a 
duopoly choosing a location on a line.  A representative approach would be that of 
d‟Aspremont, et al. (1979).  When consumers are uniformly distributed on a line and 
firms choose products first and then prices, the result is that of maximum differentiation.  
That is, producers will locate as far as possible from one other in order to minimize price 
competition and maximize profits.  Other models use a circular city approach and assume 
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maximum differentiation in order to focus on the entry decision (Salop 1979).  This 
analysis reveals the intuitive result that as fixed costs fall, entry increases, prices 
approach marginal costs and the market is approximately competitive.  Therefore, as in 
the Rosen model, when fixed costs are low, most consumers can purchase a product that 
meets their individual preferences.  Very large markets where demand is sufficient to 
support a large number of providers may approximate the conditions of such a model.  In 
this case, spillover effects would be minimal.   
The maximum differentiation result described above is highly dependent on the 
assumption of a uniform distribution of preferences.  In a situation where fixed costs limit 
the variety of products offered, it is less clear how a non-uniform distribution of 
consumer preferences affects the equilibrium distribution of product attributes.  It is 
noted that the maximum differentiation result is less likely when consumer demand is 
more concentrated.  Take the example of locating on a line.  Locating at the endpoints is 
no longer sensible if the population is concentrated on one end.  The trade-off between 
the strategic effect of limiting price competition and the demand effect of gaining market 
share is dominated by the strategic effect in the case of two firms and uniform 
preferences.  With consumer preferences more concentrated however, the demand effect 
may dominate causing producers to locate closer to one another to compete for 
customers.  Under this scenario, it is more likely that a shift in the distribution of 
preferences would result in a shift in the distribution of quality.  The results noted thus far 
apply specifically to horizontal differentiation models.  These results can vary somewhat 
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when incorporating the concept of a vertical product space where all individuals agree on 
the overall ranking of products, but have different incomes or insurance coverage.   
Models of vertical differentiation bear many similarities to the location models 
noted above.  Shaked and Sutton (1982) find that, under certain assumptions, a duopoly 
with a uniform income distribution also displays maximum differentiation in quality 
space.  Costs are assumed to be zero.  Under an assumption limiting the width of the 
income distribution, it is shown that at most two firms will enter.   Proceeding under this 
assumption, it can be shown that exactly two firms will enter and produce distinct 
products if the income distribution is wide enough.  The differentiation is due to the fact 
that if qualities become close, price competition would reduce profit for both firms.  
Finally, if more than two firms are present, quality competition will lead all firms to set a 
high quality and price competition will drive prices and profits to zero.  While the results 
are elegant in demonstrating the differentiation result in quality space, the simplifying 
assumptions of a uniform income distribution, the width of which allows for only two 
firms to enter, as well as zero production costs leave much to be desired for a realistic 
application to a health care market.   
Nonetheless, the above models are useful in considering the incentives for product 
variety for the purpose of examining the effect of multiple payers on healthcare quality.  
Fixed costs will limit the number of providers in a market and the distribution of 
preferences will determine where in product space the firms will locate.  One common 
theme of the above models is an assumption of uniformly distributed consumer 
preferences.  While this is analytically convenient, it may be practically implausible in 
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the case of preferences for health care quality.  The more evenly spread healthcare 
consumers are across the preference distribution, the greater the likelihood that a 
distribution of products will arise that is similarly distributed.  A more concentrated 
distribution of preferences will result in a more concentrated selection of products.  Shifts 
in the coverage distribution at the market level can thus have a significant impact on the 
distribution of quality available in the market and could enhance or diminish any 
spillover effects already occurring at the provider-level.     
Multiple products 
The review of applicable theory has thus far suggested that incentives of multiple 
payers can be balanced to determine a commonly provided quality of care.  Payer-
specific incentives however can influence the provision of unique elements of care and 
reduce any potential spillovers on the common quality.  Furthermore, incentives for 
providers to differentiate themselves in response to the distribution of coverage can have 
a variety of effects on available quality and the presence of spillover effects.  The 
discussion thus far however has focused on the quality of some ambiguous health care 
service which has these shared and unique elements of quality and may be provided to 
multiple payers by multiple providers in a market.  The final complication in considering 
how the incentives of multiple payers affect the delivery of care is that there is not one 
generic service provided by a hospital for which it must choose a price and quality.  
Hospitals provide many services and these services appeal to different sets of payers and 
have different potential profitability.  Any balancing of incentives is likely to occur not 
only within a particular service line and across payers, but across service lines and payers 
and providers in the market.  Now, we examine the possibility that multiple payers and 
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the incentives they create may affect not only the level of shared and unique quality of a 
given service and its distribution across providers, but also the mix of services available 
and their quality levels.  This element may be particularly important because hospitals are 
constrained in their ability to set prices to certain payers and are expected to provide care 
to non-paying patients.  Their ability to adjust their service mix and the quality of each 
service thus may be an important mechanism for seeking profits.  If one service becomes 
relatively more profitable due to a shift in payer mix, it may show an improvement in 
quality while a relatively less profitable service could see a quality decline.   
Horwitz (2005) investigates the mix of services provided by all general hospitals 
over time by concentrating on the profitability of these services.  She finds that the 
hospitals do vary in the set of services that they provide and that the variation is 
correlated with ownership type in predictable ways.  For-profit hospitals are most likely 
to offer the most profitable set of services while government hospitals are most likely to 
offer the least profitable set of services.  Non-profit hospitals typically fall somewhere in 
between.  This is evidence of product differentiation and the insurance distribution in the 
market no doubt contributes to both the mix of provider types as well as the mix of 
services at each provider.  Horwitz and Nichols (2009) follow up on this study by 
examining the competitive effects on the service mix provided by non-profits.  They find 
that non-profits in markets with high for-profit penetration are more likely to produce 
relatively profitable services and less likely to produce relatively unprofitable services.  
In regards to the product differentiation discussed previously, this may present some 
evidence of a tendency towards clustering rather than specialization as non-profits choose 
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to compete with for-profits on these services rather than specialize in their own product 
mix.   
Summary 
At this point, the complexity of the task of predicting the impact of the insurance 
distribution on the level and distribution of quality should be quite clear.  A fairly simple 
model with two payers shows that under certain conditions, the common quality provided 
will reflect a compromise between the two payers.  Additional work has shown that each 
payer also affects the individual intensity of care that is provided to its patients.  Others 
have suggested that the common quality and the unique quality are related.  To date, no 
previous work in health economics has tried to incorporate the effect of the insurance 
distribution on the distribution of quality across hospitals, but the work on product 
differentiation indicates that this could have very important implications for the 
equilibrium results.  Finally, quality is most often defined as some level of intensity of 
care that is provided by the hospital.  This does not account for the fact that this intensity 
may vary widely across the different types of services that are provided by a hospital.  
Any attempt to incorporate all of the potential avenues through which the insurance 
distribution might influence quality of care would likely fall short of the simplicity 
necessary in a formal model and the ability to provide any clear and consistent 
hypotheses.  The various mechanisms through which the distribution of coverage may 
impact the level and distribution of quality provided in a market are outlined above 
however and ultimately the question is an empirical one and will be pursued as such.   
Spillover Effects of the Uninsured to Medicare Beneficiaries 
25 
 
As this study focuses on the impact of local uninsurance rates on quality for 
Medicare beneficiaries, the following discussion concentrates more specifically on the 
uninsured and Medicare populations.  Hospitals can influence the quality of care received 
by their patients through some common level of quality for each service, through a 
unique quality provided to each payer for each service, and through the mix of services 
that they provide.  They can also influence the quality provided to those in the market by 
choosing to accept or reject individual payers or patients.  Each of these elements may be 
influenced by the distribution of payers and the competitive nature of the healthcare 
market.  Unique characteristics of the uninsured as well as Medicare beneficiaries also 
contribute to the potential for spillover effects in this context.     
Uninsured individuals differ from their insured counterparts in two important 
ways when it comes to their utilization of health care services.  When seeking non-
emergency care, uninsured individuals are generally required to bear the full price of the 
services they receive.  Not only do they not have the benefit of insurance itself in order to 
minimize the risk of high expenditures, but the prices they face for each and every service 
are higher than the discounted prices charged to insurance companies.  The effect of such 
high out-of-pocket (OOP) costs is to substantially lower demand for services by 
uninsured individuals.  This lower demand by the uninsured is one mechanism through 
which this population may create spillovers to Medicare patients. 
Despite their typically high OOP costs, however, uninsured individuals can also 
obtain care at little or no cost in certain circumstances.  The law requires hospitals to 
stabilize any patient without regard to their ability to pay.  Furthermore, non-profit 
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hospitals are obligated to provide community benefits in exchange for their exemption 
from certain taxes.  Among such community benefits is the provision of uncompensated 
care to those with low ability to pay.  Therefore, uninsured individuals generally use less 
care than their insured counterparts, but in some cases also pay less for the care they do 
receive through a variety of charity mechanisms.  Each of these characteristics of the 
uninsured and their use of health care services has the potential to affect the quality 
choices made by hospitals in a multitude of ways.  The potential effects of their lower 
demand for care are addressed first followed by a discussion of the impact of 
uncompensated care. 
Uninsured Demand and Hospital Quality 
As discussed, uninsured individuals demand less care than their insured neighbors 
due to the high OOP prices they must pay for care.  A large uninsured population in a 
health care market has the effect of lowering the total market demand for a variety of 
services, particularly high-cost services.  This may have a variety of effects on the 
elements of quality discussed above.  As was suggested by Glazer and McGuire, the shift 
in demand could have an effect on some common elements of quality provided to all 
payers.  A more price elastic population of private payers would likely have the effect of 
bringing the level of shared quality down.  This could be reflected in smaller levels of 
investment in diagnostic technology or nursing staff, for example.  It could also manifest 
itself in a smaller number of service offerings as the demand necessary to support 
additional services, technologies or staffing might not be present.  This lack of demand 
would then effectively lower the shared quality for all patients including Medicare 
beneficiaries.  To the extent that ethical obligations exist to provide comparable care to 
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all payers, shared elements of quality would not be limited to those consisting of high 
fixed costs.   
In contrast to the drop in shared quality in response to more uninsured, access to 
providers may improve as the number of privately insured declines making Medicare 
beneficiaries relatively more profitable.  This increase in access could be seen as a 
positive spillover effect.  As was noted by Dor and Farley, as well as Glied and Zivin, 
hospitals also provide a unique quality level to each payer although there may be some 
limitations to this concept in relation to ethical obligations.  In response to a smaller 
privately insured population and thus a drop in shared quality, the incentive to provide 
additional quality to Medicare beneficiaries might be enhanced.  If the drop in demand 
from private payers results in a decline in shared quality, the provider may raise variable 
quality to compensate.  The ultimate effect on the total quality or outcomes is unclear and 
subject to investigation.  However, the evidence suggests that low demand by the 
uninsured could have the effect of improving access and boosting the unique quality 
received by Medicare beneficiaries.  Unique quality may consist of any element of care 
that can be varied based on the individual patient.  This could include prescription drugs, 
diagnostic testing, or room amenities.  Shared quality on the other hand cannot be varied 
based on the individual patient.  This may include the existence of a burn or cardiac 
surgery unit or the nurse staffing levels at the provider. 
The mix of services available to Medicare beneficiaries and the quality of these 
services may also be affected by the presence of more uninsured.  Providers may be less 
able to subsidize less profitable services with the revenues from more profitable services 
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as demand declines.  Thus, a shift away from unprofitable services may occur.  
Furthermore, providers may choose to invest in the quality of their profitable service lines 
in order to attract more patients as overall demand declines.  The effect of the uninsured 
on service mix may result in a reduction in provision of less profitable services, but an 
increase or improvements in the quality of more profitable services.  
The effects discussed thus far are also likely to vary based on the extent of 
competition and differentiation in the market.  Large markets are likely to have sufficient 
demand to provide a wide variety of services and will be less affected by the presence of 
a large uninsured population.  Spillovers on shared quality will thus be less likely in large 
markets.  The above also predicts an increase in unique quality in response to more 
uninsured.  The impact of market size is ambiguous here.  Improved access to care 
resulting from a lack of private pay patients may be stronger in large markets, but 
increases in quality designed to compensate for drops in shared quality should be lower in 
these markets. 
Uncompensated Care and Hospital Quality 
While in many cases, uninsured individuals use less care due to the high OOP 
costs they must face, there are times when the uninsured are able to obtain care at little or 
no cost.  The uncompensated care that they receive can also impact the level and 
distribution of quality in the market.  The mechanisms may be somewhat different 
however from the effects of their reduced demand.  It is also important to recognize that 
the amount of uncompensated care provided to the uninsured is chosen by the hospital so 
the cause and effect in this case are less clear.  
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Uncompensated care, like reduced demand, can have a negative effect on shared 
elements of quality.  In the short-run, uncompensated care will simply result in a loss to 
the provider.  In the long-run however, the presence of a large population using 
uncompensated care will reduce the incentive to invest in costly quality improvements 
because higher costs will mean higher losses.  The size of the market and its level of 
differentiation will minimize such an effect.  Where the uninsured are more concentrated 
among a few safety-net hospitals,  uncompensated care effects will be isolated.  This 
should result in fewer spillover effects to Medicare beneficiaries. 
The effect of uncompensated care on the distribution of unique quality across 
payers is somewhat less clear.  More uncompensated care may shift some resources away 
from other payers.  Medicare may be a preferred choice because the profit on private-
payers is likely to be higher.  Thus, uncompensated care may result in less access for 
Medicare beneficiaries.  On the other hand, as in the demand scenario, if uncompensated 
care ultimately results in a reduction in the shared quality available, Medicare 
beneficiaries may be compensated with an increase in the variable costs of quality.   
The effect of uncompensated care on the mix of services and their quality is also 
unclear.  A case could be made that more uncompensated care would create incentives 
for a provider to invest in more profitable services and to improve the quality of those 
services to increase demand, both in the interest of subsidizing their uncompensated care 
losses.  In this case, a hospital with more uncompensated care losses would provide a 
more profitable mix of services and higher quality profitable services.  The argument 
could also be made however that those hospitals that provide a more profitable service 
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mix are better equipped to provide uncompensated care.  This brings up the question of 
direction of causation.     
      In general, market size and provider differentiation are expected to significantly 
diminish the effects of uncompensated care because the users of such care will be more 
concentrated at particular providers.  
Hypotheses 
 The above discussion considers many of the possible ways in which the local 
uninsurance rate might affect the care delivered in the market and to Medicare 
beneficiaries more specifically.  Here, we generate a set of hypotheses to be tested, based 
on the applicable theory and the above discussion.  Ideally, we would like to examine the 
effects of uncompensated care separately from those of low demand.  Unfortunately, the 
data does not allow for a separate identification of uncompensated care.  Thus, all 
hypotheses will be generalized for testing the impacts of local uninsurance rates on a 
variety of outcomes.   
H1: A high uninsurance rate will be associated with lower levels of shared quality  
H2: A high uninsurance rate will be associated with improved access for 
Medicare beneficiaries 
H3: A high uninsurance rate will be associated with higher levels of unique 
quality for Medicare beneficiaries 
H4: Based on the above, a high uninsurance rate will have an ambiguous effect 
on total quality 
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The above are the primary hypotheses that are tested in the following chapters.  Each one 
has the potential to be influenced by market size.  Larger markets are likely to show less 
evidence for H1 and H3.  Finally, the effects on product mix are also examined though no 
formal hypothesis emerges.  The next chapter discusses the data to be used in the analysis 
and the following two chapters present the analytical methods and the results. 
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Chapter 3: Data Sources and Descriptive Statistics 
By examining the relationship between local uninsurance rates and the care 
delivered to Medicare beneficiaries, this work will shed light on the question of how 
providers respond to financial incentives and what contributes to the variation in access, 
utilization and outcomes across areas.  In the interest of testing the hypothesis on total 
quality, this study will examine how the local uninsurance rate ultimately relates to 
outcomes for Medicare beneficiaries by examining the effects of the uninsurance rate on 
mortality from a variety of conditions.  Next, it will test the hypothesis regarding shared 
quality by considering the impact of local uninsurance rates on the overall availability of 
hospital services in the market.  Finally, it will test the hypotheses on access and unique 
quality by investigating the effect of the insurance distribution on utilization by Medicare 
beneficiaries.  The study will primarily use cross-sectional analysis and identify the 
effects of the insurance distribution using the variation in local uninsurance rates across 
areas.  Some supplementary analyses will use time series data and examine the impact of 
changes in uninsurance over time.  The main cross-sectional analyses will pool a variety 
of data from the years 2000-2002 while the time series analysis will focus on the change 
between this period and the period 2004-2006.   
In order to address the questions of interest, a great deal of data on local insurance 
distributions and Medicare discharge data, as well as hospital and market characteristics 
has been compiled.  Current Population Survey data is used to determine local 
uninsurance rates.  Data from the Area Resource File (ARF) supplements this data to 
provide a more detailed picture of the sample markets.  The American Hospital 
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Association (AHA) annual survey is used to identify and describe the hospitals in the 
sample markets.   Finally, MEDPAR data on all Medicare inpatient discharges is used to 
measure the outcomes for Medicare beneficiaries.  This chapter will describe the data in 
some detail and lay out the descriptive foundations for the analyses that will be discussed 
in the following chapters. 
Local Uninsurance Rates 
Identifying insurance coverage at the local level is essential to this analysis, but 
proved to be somewhat challenging.  Most typical household surveys used to estimate 
insurance coverage are designed for national estimates.  A few allow for reliable and 
representative estimates at the state level, but most do not even identify sub-state 
divisions much less produce estimates that are representative at this level.  Because there 
is not a perfect measure of insurance at a level that could be considered to represent a 
local healthcare market, this study uses data from the March supplement of the Current 
Population Survey (CPS) at the MSA level.  The March CPS supplement is a commonly 
used household survey for estimating the ranks of the uninsured.  The survey is 
conducted each March and the results are a commonly cited source of the current number 
of uninsured individuals in the US.  While the CPS is only designed to be representative 
at the national and state levels, it identifies roughly 240 Metropolitan Statistical Areas 
(MSAs) for which estimates of the uninsured can be made.  By pooling multiple years of 
the survey, the sample size in each MSA can be increased leading to more precise 
estimates.  Again, the sample was not chosen to be representative of MSAs and may 
result in estimates that vary substantially from the true values.  Despite these concerns, 
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the relatively large sample sizes and the generally reliable insurance definition make the 
MSA-level insurance rates from the CPS the best available local insurance measure for 
this study.   
Aside from sampling error which will be present on any survey-based measure, 
the major drawback to using the CPS for this analysis is the fact that it does not 
separately identify any non-metropolitan areas and is limited by sample size constraints 
to the largest MSAs.  This is a limitation specifically because, as noted in the conceptual 
framework, we expect certain spillover effects to be more prominent in smaller markets.  
For the purpose of this analysis, two consecutive years of CPS data will be pooled to 
create estimates of the insurance distribution at the MSA level.  The sample is then 
limited to the 100 largest MSAs by CPS sample size.  By limiting the sample of MSAs 
and pooling two years of the CPS data, each MSA has at least 400 observations on which 
to base the local uninsurance rate.  Some additional adjustments were made to the MSA 
definitions in order to make them consistent over time.  The MSA definition underwent a 
major change in 2003 which is reflected on the 2005 CPS.  All of the previous years are 
re-coded to roughly match this definition.  Additional information on these adjustments is 
available upon request. 
Table 3.1 displays the trends in insurance coverage at the national level over the 
time period of interest from 2000 to 2005.  These are the CPS survey years, but the CPS 
is intended to represent the full-year insurance coverage for the prior calendar year.  In 
other words, those listed as uninsured on the CPS were, in theory, uninsured for the entire 
calendar year prior to the March survey based on the wording of the insurance questions.  
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In comparisons with a number of other surveys, however, the CPS insurance rates have 
actually been shown to be more in line with estimates of the number of uninsured at a 
point in time (Swartz 1986).  After a small decrease in 2001, the uninsurance rate steadily 
climbs until 2004 with another small dip in 2005.  These estimates have already been 
adjusted to eliminate the impact of the verification question that was added in 2001 so 
that the estimates are consistent over the entire time period.   
As has been noted, the analysis will place some emphasis on how market size 
affects the potential for and realization of spillover effects.  Tables 3.2 and 3.3 display the 
sample markets, by size, and the trends in the uninsurance rate over time in these 
markets.  Note that there is a great deal of variability in the insurance rates across areas 
and over time in both small and large markets.   Both sources of variation will be used to 
identify the spillover effects of uninsurance in a variety of analyses.  The standard errors 
of the CPS proportions are also included in the tables.  The average standard error of the 
proportion uninsured for an MSA in 2001 is 1 percent while the standard deviation of the 
estimates is over 5 percent.  This indicates that there is substantial meaningful variation 
in the estimates of the uninsurance rate.   The changes in the uninsurance rate over time 
are statistically significant in roughly half of the MSAs and are more likely to be 
significant in the larger markets.   The implications of the measurement error in the 
insurance rates will be discussed further and some additional analytical approaches will 
be used to add credence to the results.   
Market characteristics 
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Now that we have explored the uninsurance rates in small and large markets over 
time, we will examine the other characteristics of the sample markets over the study 
period.  Some of these characteristics will ultimately be used as outcomes in later models 
examining access and utilization at the market-level.  Others will be used as controls.  
Data from the Area Resource File (ARF) will be used to examine the characteristics of 
the sample markets.  The data years used to match the pooled insurance distributions will 
be 2000 and 2004.  This reflects a compromise between the calendar year and data year 
interpretations of the CPS years that have been used for insurance purposes.  CPS survey 
years 2000 and 2001, for instance, have been pooled to obtain the relevant insurance 
distribution for the primary analysis and the ARF data from 2000 will be used with this 
data.  Using the 2000 data for the cross-sectional analyses also allows access to the most 
accurate data based on the 2000 census.  Data on population size, poverty status, and the 
racial distribution of the market are measured without error in this year only.    This will 
prove useful in controlling for market characteristics other than insurance that may affect 
the delivery of care to Medicare beneficiaries.  Table 3.4 displays the characteristics of 
the sample markets, by size and over time.   
In 2000, small markets have a lower average uninsurance rate than larger markets.  
The small and large markets‟ distribution across the 5 quintiles of insurance coverage 
(created using the entire sample where quintile 1 represents the 20 MSAs with the lowest 
uninsurance rates and quintile 5 represents the 20 MSAs with the highest uninsurance 
rates) is also shown.  MSAs with the highest uninsurance rates, those in quintile 5, are 
more dominant in the larger markets which is consistent with their higher average 
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uninsurance rate.  Smaller markets also have higher average Medicaid rates and lower 
rates of private coverage than larger markets in 2000.  Additional calculations show that 
from 2001 to 2005, 67 percent of small markets and 73 percent of large markets lost 
coverage.  Thus, small markets have slightly lower uninsurance rates in the initial period 
and lose somewhat less coverage over time.  Their lower uninsurance rates are driven at 
least in part by higher rates of Medicaid coverage however.     
The racial distribution also varies across small and large markets, largely due to 
the presence of larger black and smaller white populations in large markets.  The 
proportion Hispanic is only slightly higher in small markets than large in 2000.  Income 
and poverty measures are also considered.  Percent in poverty is lower and per capita 
income is higher in large markets.  The unemployment rate is also lower in large markets.  
These observations are consistent with the higher rates of private coverage in large 
markets and lower rates of Medicaid coverage.  Also interesting is how these measures 
change over the time period 2000 to 2004.  In the time period of interest, the poverty rate 
is rising, unemployment is rising and the rise in uninsurance appears to be driven by a 
reduction in private coverage that is only partially offset by an increase in Medicaid.   
In addition to demographics and economic conditions in the market, the 
characteristics of the health care market vary as well.  Small markets have fewer hospitals 
than their larger counterparts though both have seen a decline over the study period.  
Small markets also have a slightly higher admission rate per capita which may be 
consistent with the higher levels of insurance coverage in these markets.  Length of stay 
varies little by market size, but does decline over the study period.  ER visits per capita 
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are also higher in smaller markets, but unlike admissions, are rising in both small and 
large markets over time.  The staffing ratios for nurses in the market are almost equal for 
small and large markets in 2000.  Both the nurse to bed ratio and percentage RNs rises 
over this time period with the increase being just slightly larger in smaller markets.   
Some of the characteristics discussed above, including the racial and income 
distribution of the market, are those that one would expect to have an impact on the 
delivery of care in the market.  Several of these however are also likely to be highly 
correlated with the local uninsurance rate.  In order to create a clearer picture of how 
uninsurance relates to these other market characteristics, Table 3.5 displays the 
correlations between the local uninsurance rate as estimated by the CPS and several 
market-level characteristics for the year 2000.  Very strong positive correlations are seen 
between the proportion Hispanic in the market and the proportion uninsured.  This is 
consistent across market sizes although the correlations are slightly higher in smaller 
markets.  The same pattern exists between the market-level poverty rate and the 
uninsurance rate.  High correlations exist in both small and large markets with the 
correlation in large markets slightly smaller.  Including these two market-level 
characteristics as explanatory variables in simple OLS regressions on the uninsurance 
rate results in R-squared values of 0.78 and 0.69 for small and large markets, 
respectively.  This will present some challenges in modeling the effects of all of these 
market-level characteristics together.   
In the interest of establishing a set of market level variables that can be used 
together to model the delivery of care in the market, some collinearity diagnostics are 
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displayed in Table 3.6.  The results of these diagnostics indicate that including measures 
of the insurance distribution, the poverty rate and the racial distribution together in a 
model would be unwise.  Substituting per capita income for the poverty measure, but 
keeping the racial distribution diminishes the collinearity concerns.  In weaker models 
however, such as the logistic regressions that will be used in some of the analysis, the 
collinearity between the proportion Hispanic  and the uninsurance rate even in the 
absence of a poverty measure may also cause problems.  Concerns will be especially 
strong in smaller markets.  A common rule of thumb for diagnosing collinearity uses a 
threshold of ten for the variance inflation factor (VIF) as indicative of a problem.  For 
weaker models, however, some sources suggest that a VIF of as low as 2.5 may be of 
concern (Allison 1999).  This information will be used in model specification in the 
following chapters.   
Hospital characteristics 
After identifying the 100 MSAs with sufficient sample to analyze the changes in 
the insurance distribution and describing those markets more thoroughly using the ARF 
data, the hospitals in these markets were identified on the AHA annual surveys.  The 
community hospitals(non-federal, short-term, general and specialty hospitals) present in 
the markets of interest in either of two years were identified.  The years 2001-02 were 
used to match the CPS insurance years 2000-01, for instance. 
Table 3.7 displays the characteristics of all of the community hospitals in the 
sample markets, by market size.  These may not correspond directly with the hospitals 
that are analyzed when using the MEDPAR outcomes and utilization data because some 
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AHA hospitals were missing the necessary Medicare identifier to merge them with the 
patients from the MEDPAR file.  Also, some of the hospitals did not have any matching 
Medicare discharges on the corresponding MEDPAR files.  These were typically 
children‟s or various other specialty hospitals or LTC hospitals.  They will be left in the 
sample however for some general analysis on the availability of hospital services in the 
area. 
Comparing the hospital characteristics in small and large markets elicits some 
interesting observations.  For-profits are slightly more common in small markets in both 
years.    The large shift in for-profit presence from 2001 to 2005 coincides with a large 
drop in the proportion classified as general hospitals.  This would seem to indicate a rapid 
expansion of for-profit specialty hospitals.     
Hospitals in small markets unsurprisingly have fewer beds than those in large 
markets.  Furthermore, hospitals in both market sizes are getting smaller over the study 
period.  In both small and large markets, length of stay goes up in the study period.    
Hospitals in small markets also have a smaller percentage of Medicaid discharges and a 
larger proportion of Medicare discharges, but in combination, a larger portion of public 
discharges than the hospitals in larger markets.  There is also an increasing reliance on 
public payers as a proportion of hospital discharges over time in both types of markets.  
Staffing also varies by market size and over time.  Hospitals in small markets have a 
lower proportion of RNs on their nursing staff.  The proportion RNs does increase in all 
markets however over time.  The nurse to bed ratio is also increasing over the study 
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period in both small and large markets as is the RN to bed ratio.  The nurse to bed ratio in 
small markets is lower than that in large markets as was the RN to bed ratio.   
The above information indicates that hospitals in small markets may be under 
some additional financial pressure due to the larger presence of public payers and 
evidenced by the use of lower cost staff.  The increase in for-profits and specialty 
hospitals seems to be evidence of a differentiation effect which is interestingly occurring 
in small markets to a greater extent than in large markets.  This is also consistent with the 
more prominent drop in presence of public hospitals in small markets.  This is somewhat 
out of line with expectations that differentiation would be stronger in larger markets, but 
will be important to consider in interpreting later results.     
Table 3.8 explores the availability of particular services in the sample hospitals.  
The departments and specialty services are broken into groups of profitable and 
unprofitable services based on work by Jill Horwitz and colleagues (2005).  With a few 
exceptions, a larger proportion of hospitals in large markets offer profitable services than 
those in small markets.  Substantial growth occurs over time in both small and large 
markets in the proportion of hospitals providing MRI and PET scanners as well as more 
modest growth in the provision of cardiac surgery and catheterization.  There are less 
consistent results over time in the provision of NICU and PICU services and a decline in 
the proportion of hospitals providing CT scanners and ultrasounds.   
The results for the set of unprofitable services are quite different.  Hospitals in 
small markets are also less likely than those in large markets to provide unprofitable 
services, but the discrepancies are not as pronounced as those for profitable services.  
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Over time, however, the provision of unprofitable services declines in both small and 
large markets.  The declines are more pronounced in small markets and also seem to 
coincide with the changes in economic and insurance conditions.  This may be consistent 
with the observation that over the same time period small markets experience a larger 
proportional growth in for-profit hospitals.   
Discharge data 
Following the creation of the hospital sample in the 100 MSAs, the Medicare 
discharges from the sample hospitals are identified on the MEDPAR data.  Two years of 
discharges are pooled to match the sample from the AHA.  The study years again are 
2001-02, and 2005-06.  The MEDPAR data contains 100% of the Medicare discharges 
from the sample hospitals.  The use of the 100% MEDPAR files is particularly important 
for this study because we are working at the MSA level and it is unlikely that the smaller 
files would be representative at this level.  Outcomes have been measured for the 
Medicare population by applying the AHRQ Quality Indicators to the Medicare 
discharges.  The quality indicators identify mortality from a set of conditions that has 
been determined to be influenced by hospital quality.  These measures are an admittedly 
crude measure of quality because it is difficult to control for all of the additional elements 
that contribute to an individual‟s probability of death.    Table 3.9 displays the outcomes 
and utilization measures from hospitals in our sample markets, by market size.  
Differences in outcomes by market size vary by condition.  Those in small markets 
consistently have lower mortality on CABG and AMI and consistently higher mortality 
on CHF, Stroke, GI hemorrhage and hip fracture.  Mortality rates on virtually all the 
conditions of interest however are improving over the study time period.       
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Table 3.9 also displays the utilization measures that will be used to test the 
hypotheses on unique quality provided to Medicare beneficiaries.  There are some fairly 
consistent trends in the utilization measures.  Lap chlolys are growing over time in both 
small and large markets.  Similarly bilateral catheterization is falling consistently over 
time, but in this case is lower in small markets.  Incidental appendectomies are also 
falling in both market sizes over time, but here, the rate is higher in small markets.  There 
is a trend over time in both small and large markets showing higher use of ICUs.  The use 
of CT scans is also growing rapidly over time in both small and large markets with large 
markets showing higher use in both periods.  Other imaging follows the same pattern.  
Unfortunately, discharge data provides only a limited set of utilization measures for 
analyzing the role of local uninsurance on unique quality delivered to Medicare 
beneficiaries.  Additional measures of the individual processes of care experienced by 
Medicare beneficiaries might provide better evidence of such quality.  
Finally, additional individual characteristics are shown in Table 3.10.  These will 
be used for risk-adjustment and individual level controls.  Age and sex are relatively 
constant across market size and over time.  The race distribution however varies 
considerably by market size as well as over time.  As was true in the markets as a whole, 
blacks represent a larger portion of discharges in large markets.  Hispanics are more 
prevalent in large market discharges however, which is not the case for the population 
more generally.  While the percentage black grows over the study period in large 
markets, it falls over the same period in small markets.  Hispanics on the other hand are 
growing as a proportion of discharges in both small and large markets.  There is also 
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substantial growth over time in the proportion of those discharged that are disabled or 
have ESRD.  ESRD is more prevalent in larger markets while disability status does not 
have a clear pattern.   
The discharges used for this analysis were chosen by identifying all of the 
discharges in the hospitals in the sample markets.  This does not necessarily mean that the 
individuals receiving care in these MSAs also live in the area.  The proportion that 
actually lives in the MSA in which they receive care is lower for small markets.  This is 
likely due to the fact that the hospitals in these markets will serve individuals from the 
surrounding non-metro areas.   
 Small markets have a smaller proportion of admissions classified as emergent 
than those in large markets.  Regardless of size, however, this proportion is growing over 
time.  It is unclear whether this is actually a meaningful trend in terms of the severity of 
the conditions upon admission or some type of administrative change.  If it represents a 
failure of ambulatory care over the time period of interest, this would be an important 
observation.    
Over time, those who ever had Medicaid or who had Medicaid in all twelve 
months of the calendar year increased steadily in small and large markets.  Those in small 
markets were generally less likely to have Medicaid however.  From 2001 to 2005, there 
was new growth in HMO coverage in Medicare as well.  This may be related to the 
passage of the Medicare Modernization Act in 2003 which changed some of the details of 
the Medicare Advantage program.  Again, however, it was more common for those in 
large markets to be in an HMO regardless of the timing. 
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Aside from the racial distribution of those in small and large markets, which are 
quite different, the differences are less than striking.  With very clearly different market 
and hospital characteristics in small and large markets, the beneficiaries being treated 
seem to show the least contrast.  There may of course be unobserved differences which 
will need to be addressed later.  The most glaring omission is the inability to identify the 
income of the Medicare beneficiaries who are using the hospital.  We know the income 
parameters at the market level and knowing Medicaid status identifies the poorest 
beneficiaries.  We do not know however which beneficiaries have supplemental 
insurance coverage and this will be important in later discussions.  This gives us a fairly 
good descriptive picture however of the individuals in all markets over time. 
The data described above will be used to further examine the relationship between 
MSA-level uninsurance and outcomes of care received by Medicare beneficiaries.  The 
differences between small and large markets described above as well as the trends over 
time will all be important in interpreting the results of the analyses in the following 
chapters.   
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Table 3.1 
National Insurance Trends 
CPS Survey Years
Insurance Distribution 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Medicare and ESI 4.17 4.24 4.29 4.13 4.36 4.46
Medicare and NG 3.33 3.38 3.32 3.25 3.19 3.1
Medicare only 5.66 5.75 5.84 6.01 6.08 6.06
Employer coverage 57.83 58.19 56.72 55.7 54.52 54.5
Non-group coverage 5.67 5.45 5.47 5.59 5.58 5.7
Medicaid 6.8 6.75 7.46 7.8 8.41 8.74
Other public 1.02 0.98 1.05 1.05 1.04 1.1
Uninsured 15.53 15.28 15.85 16.47 16.82 16.34
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Table 3.2
Uninsurance Rates in Small Markets
2001 to 2005
MSA Name 00-01 SE 04-05 SE
Difference 
2001 to 2005
Akron, OH PMSA                9.7% 1.1% 9.6% 1.0% 0.0%
Albany-Schenectady-Troy, NY   5.8% 0.9% 10.4% 1.0% 4.6% *
Albuquerque, NM MSA           20.5% 0.9% 18.5% 0.9% -1.9%
Allentown-Bethlehem-Easton, PA 5.9% 0.9% 8.8% 1.0% 2.9% *
Anchorage, AK MSA             15.5% 1.0% 18.4% 0.9% 3.0% *
Ann Arbor, MI PMSA            7.5% 1.0% 8.0% 1.0% 0.5%
Bakersfield, CA MSA           18.5% 1.8% 13.9% 1.3% -4.6% *
Birmingham, AL MSA             14.6% 1.3% 11.7% 0.9% -3.0% *
Boise City, ID MSA             15.1% 1.0% 17.1% 0.9% 2.0%
Burlington, VT MSA             10.8% 1.2% 10.5% 0.7% -0.2%
Charleston-North Charleston,   16.3% 1.7% 15.9% 1.2% -0.3%
Colorado Springs, CO MSA       9.9% 1.3% 15.0% 1.0% 5.0% *
Dayton-Springfield, OH MSA     7.8% 0.9% 11.6% 1.0% 3.8% *
Des Moines, IA MSA             9.7% 1.2% 12.3% 0.9% 2.6% *
Dover, DE MSA      15.5% 1.7% 12.8% 1.1% -2.6%
Dutchess County, NY PMSA       13.1% 1.4% 13.0% 1.3% -0.1%
El Paso, TX MSA                34.6% 1.7% 33.8% 1.6% -0.8%
Fargo-Moorhead, ND-MN MSA   11.6% 1.4% 9.5% 0.9% -2.1%
Fayetteville-Springdale-  15.1% 1.7% 15.2% 1.3% 0.1%
Fresno, CA MSA                18.7% 1.5% 19.4% 1.3% 0.7%
Greenville-Spartanburg-        13.5% 1.3% 17.8% 1.3% 4.3% *
Harrisburg-Lebanon-Carlisle,   8.7% 1.2% 10.3% 1.1% 1.6%
Honolulu, HI MSA               10.2% 0.7% 10.4% 0.4% 0.2%
Jackson, MS MSA                16.8% 1.7% 19.1% 1.4% 2.3%
Knoxville, TN MSA              10.9% 1.6% 13.9% 1.4% 2.9%
Lancaster, PA MSA              13.0% 1.7% 17.1% 1.7% 4.1% *
Lansing-East Lansing, MI MSA  11.0% 1.5% 14.8% 1.5% 3.8% *
Las Cruces, NM MSA  23.7% 1.7% 28.4% 1.8% 4.7% *
Lincoln, NE MSA               10.3% 1.4% 13.9% 1.3% 3.6% *
Little Rock-North Little Rock, 11.6% 1.2% 12.7% 1.1% 1.1%
McAllen-Edinburg-Mission, TX  33.1% 2.2% 32.1% 1.8% -1.0%
Omaha, NE-IA MSA 9.6% 0.8% 10.8% 0.6% 1.2%
Portland, ME MSA               7.0% 1.2% 9.6% 0.8% 2.6% *
Provo-Orem, UT MSA             12.3% 1.2% 13.2% 1.0% 0.9%
Reno, NV MSA                   15.3% 1.4% 16.0% 1.0% 0.7%
Richmond-Petersburg, VA MSA    13.2% 1.4% 13.8% 1.0% 0.6%
Saginaw-Bay City-Midland, MI   9.9% 1.5% 12.3% 1.6% 2.3%
Sarasota-Bradenton, FL MSA   13.2% 1.7% 15.2% 1.5% 2.0%
Scranton-Wilkes              10.9% 1.3% 9.9% 1.1% -1.0%
Sioux Falls, SD MSA 10.9% 1.3% 11.7% 0.9% 0.8%
Springfield, MA MSA            9.7% 1.2% 11.6% 1.2% 1.9%
Syracuse, NY MSA 9.9% 1.3% 8.4% 1.2% -1.5%
Toledo, OH MSA                 13.8% 1.5% 7.9% 1.0% -5.9% *
Tucson, AZ MSA                 16.6% 1.3% 14.1% 1.1% -2.5%
Tulsa, OK MSA                  14.7% 1.3% 17.6% 1.1% 3.0% *
Ventura, CA PMSA               13.0% 1.6% 18.0% 1.5% 5.0% *
Wichita, KS MSA                13.1% 1.3% 12.3% 0.9% -0.8%
Youngstown-Warren, OH MSA     10.0% 1.2% 15.3% 1.3% 5.3% *
* Indicates that the difference in uninsurance from 2001 to 2005 is statistically significant 
at the .05 level.
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Table 3.3
Uninsurance Rates in Large Markets
2001 to 2005
MSA Name 00-01 SE 04-05 SE
Difference 
2001 to 2005
Atlanta, GA MSA               15.2% 0.8% 18.1% 0.6% 2.9% *
Austin-San Marcos, TX MSA    13.2% 1.2% 24.2% 1.2% 11.0% *
Baltimore, MD PMSA            11.6% 0.9% 13.5% 0.6% 1.9% *
Boston, MA-NH PMSA   10.5% 0.4% 12.9% 0.4% 2.4% *
Buffalo-Niagara Falls, NY MSA  10.3% 1.0% 9.6% 0.9% -0.7%
Charlotte-Gastonia-Rock Hill,  13.5% 1.0% 19.0% 0.9% 5.5% *
Chicago, IL PMSA 16.3% 0.4% 15.9% 0.3% -0.4%
Cincinnati, OH-KY-IN PMSA      12.9% 0.8% 12.6% 0.7% -0.3%
Cleveland-Lorain-Elyria, OH    13.3% 0.7% 11.8% 0.6% -1.5%
Columbus, OH MSA               11.3% 0.9% 15.4% 0.8% 4.1% *
Dallas, TX PMSA                21.1% 0.7% 24.1% 0.6% 3.0% *
Denver, CO PMSA                17.2% 0.9% 18.5% 0.6% 1.4%
Detroit, MI PMSA               11.6% 0.5% 12.3% 0.4% 0.7%
Grand Rapids-Muskegon-Holland, 10.9% 0.9% 8.9% 0.8% -2.0% *
Greenboro-Winston Salem-High   13.4% 1.0% 16.5% 1.0% 3.1% *
Hartford, CT MSA               8.9% 0.9% 12.0% 0.6% 3.1% *
Houston, TX PMSA 24.9% 0.7% 28.4% 0.7% 3.5% *
Indianapolis, IN MSA 11.3% 1.1% 14.9% 0.8% 3.7% *
Jacksonville, FL MSA     16.0% 1.2% 16.5% 1.0% 0.5%
Kansas City, MO-KS MSA         9.3% 0.7% 11.9% 0.5% 2.6% *
Las Vegas, NV-AZ MSA 21.3% 0.8% 22.0% 0.6% 0.7%
Los Angeles-Long Beach, CA    25.6% 0.4% 24.2% 0.3% -1.4% *
Louisville, KY-IN MSA 10.0% 1.0% 14.4% 0.9% 4.4% *
Memphis, TN-AR-MS MSA          16.2% 1.5% 20.0% 1.3% 3.8% *
Miami, FL PMSA                 22.6% 0.6% 24.3% 0.6% 1.6% *
Milwaukee-Waukesha, WI PMSA    9.4% 0.9% 12.8% 0.7% 3.4% *
Minneapolis-St., Paul, MN-WI   7.3% 0.6% 9.4% 0.4% 2.1% *
Nashville, TN MSA             8.0% 1.0% 14.4% 1.0% 6.5% *
New Haven-Meriden, CT PMSA    10.7% 0.8% 13.0% 0.5% 2.2% *
New Orleans, LA MSA           22.4% 1.3% 19.1% 1.1% -3.3% *
New York, NY PMSA   18.1% 0.3% 17.8% 0.3% -0.2%
Norfolk-Virginia Beach-Newport 18.0% 1.3% 14.9% 0.9% -3.1% *
Oklahoma City, OK MSA          18.6% 1.1% 19.9% 1.0% 1.3%
Orlando, FL MSA                15.4% 0.9% 22.3% 0.9% 6.9% *
Philadelphia, PA-NJ PMSA       10.7% 0.4% 13.7% 0.3% 3.0% *
Phoenix-Mesa, AZ MSA           19.6% 0.7% 18.5% 0.6% -1.1%
Pittsburgh, PA MSA             7.4% 0.6% 10.1% 0.6% 2.7% *
Portland-Vancouver, OR-WA PMSA 14.7% 0.9% 17.1% 0.6% 2.5% *
Providence-Fall River-Warwick, 7.4% 0.5% 11.9% 0.4% 4.4% *
Raleigh-Durham-Chapel Hill, NC  10.7% 1.0% 13.4% 0.8% 2.7% *
Riverside-San Bernardino, CA   20.9% 0.9% 22.4% 0.8% 1.6%
Rochester, NY MSA              9.4% 1.0% 11.7% 0.9% 2.4% *
Sacramento, CA PMSA            13.8% 1.1% 13.4% 0.9% -0.3%
St. Louis, MO-IL MSA 9.2% 0.7% 13.1% 0.6% 3.9% *
Salt Lake City-Ogden, UT MSA   11.6% 0.6% 13.1% 0.5% 1.5% *
San Antonio, TX MSA          25.8% 1.2% 26.2% 1.1% 0.4%
San Diego, CA MSA            18.1% 0.9% 16.3% 0.8% -1.8%
San Francisco, CA PMSA       17.6% 0.8% 15.6% 0.6% -1.9% *
San Jose, CA PMSA            10.8% 0.9% 14.0% 0.9% 3.2% *
Seattle-Bellevue-Everett, WA 14.0% 0.8% 14.3% 0.6% 0.3%
Tampa-St.                      17.6% 0.8% 14.3% 0.7% -3.3% *
Washington, DC-MD-VA-WV PMSA   13.5% 0.5% 14.8% 0.3% 1.3% *
* Indicates that the difference in uninsurance from 2001 to 2005 is statistically significant 
at the .05 level.
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Table 3.4
Characteristics of Sample Markets
By Market Size
Small Large Small Large
Insurance Distribution
Uninsured 0.1337 0.1441 0.1445 0.1615
Medicaid 0.0722 0.0551 0.0862 0.0738
Medicare 0.1319 0.1204 0.1310 0.1252
Private 0.6491 0.6714 0.6229 0.6304
pseudo-hhi 0.4816 0.4982 0.4517 0.4527
Uninsurance quintile
Lowest uninsurance 22.92 17.31
2 20.83 19.23
3 20.83 19.23
4 22.92 17.31
Highest uninsurance 12.5 26.92
Race and Age
White, not hispanic 0.7439 0.6851 0.7272 0.6608
Black 0.0807 0.1442 0.0828 0.1460
Hispanic 0.1257 0.1197 0.1350 0.1328
Other 0.0607 0.0640 0.0639 0.0703
Over 65 0.1217 0.1151 0.1214 0.1141
Income and Unemployment
Percent in poverty 0.1086 0.0985 0.1229 0.1177
Percent with food stamps 0.0595 0.0532 0.0815 0.0729
Unemployment rate 0.0399 0.0336 0.0532 0.0528
Per capita income 27415 32199 31149 35641
20042000
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Table 3.5
Correlates of Local Uninsurance Rates, 2000-01
By Market Size
Small Large
Race 
White -0.7727 * -0.7786 *
Black -0.0422 0.1186
Hispanic 0.8626 * 0.7338 *
Other -0.0355 0.2255
Income
Percent in poverty 0.8699 * 0.7265 *
Per capita income -0.7122 * -0.2402
Other coverage
Medicaid 0.5302 * 0.1803
Medicare 0.0144 -0.1855
Private -0.8147 * -0.8018 *
Correlation with Local 
Uninsurance Rate
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Table 3.6
Collinearity Diagnostics on Market-level Variables
By Market Size
Small Large Small Large Small Large
VIF VIF VIF VIF VIF VIF VIF VIF VIF VIF
Market-level independent variables
Uninsured 5.73 4.91 5.34 4.11 2.17 1.80 2.14 4.63 1.37 3.23
Medicaid 2.43 2.32 1.70 1.33 1.65 1.32 1.62 2.28 1.27 1.95
Medicare 1.16 1.21 1.08 1.10 1.06 1.10 1.04 1.06 1.07 1.15
Percent in poverty 11.35 5.88 6.82 3.84
Per capita income (LOG) 2.60 2.45 2.48 2.39 2.32 1.36
Hispanic 9.72 4.08 6.27 3.75
Black 1.88 2.22 1.71 1.89 1.23 1.25
Other 1.12 1.53 1.15 2.30 1.15 ]2.30
Number of Hospitals 1.36 1.51 1.30 1.64 1.21 1.63 1.02 1.11 1.57 1.37
NOTES:  
Values of VIF exceeding 10 are often regarded as indicating multicollinearity, but in weaker models, which is 
often the case in logistic regression, values above 2.5 may be a cause for concern (see, P.D. Allison, Logistic 
Regression Using the SAS System, SAS Institute, 1999).
Small Large
All No poverty
No poverty, 
no hispanic No race
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Table 3.7
Characteristics of Hospitals in Sample Markets
By Market Size
Small Large Small Large
Ownership Type
Public 0.102 0.093 0.080 0.088
Not-for-Profit 0.663 0.690 0.571 0.617
For-Profit 0.236 0.216 0.346 0.294
General hospital 0.811 0.859 0.708 0.781
Teaching hospital 0.300 0.320 0.238 0.272
Hospital Beds and Utilization
Less than 150 beds 0.536 0.426 0.593 0.468
150 to 299 0.236 0.311 0.199 0.286
300 to 499 0.146 0.174 0.132 0.166
500 plus 0.082 0.089 0.076 0.080
Length of stay (days/admits) 6.767 6.343 7.525 6.782
Pct Medicaid (mcaid/admits) 0.136 0.149 0.147 0.161
Pct Medicare (mcare/admits) 0.457 0.417 0.488 0.438
Pct Public 0.594 0.566 0.635 0.600
Personnel
Pct RNs 0.842 0.881 0.854 0.886
Nurse to bed ratio 1.322 1.366 1.500 1.539
RN to bed ratio 1.136 1.216 1.311 1.390
2005-062001-02
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Table 3.8
Hospital Service Provision
By Market Size
Small Large Small Large
Profitable Services
NiCU 0.304 0.329 0.205 0.350
PICU 0.163 0.139 0.073 0.153
Cardiac Cath Lab 0.528 0.598 0.531 0.573
Cardiac Surgery 0.393 0.355 0.404 0.381
ESWL (Lithotripsy) 0.252 0.256 0.307 0.279
Fitness Center 0.242 0.274 0.288 0.276
Birthing room 0.656 0.675 0.577 0.627
Sports Medicine 0.383 0.425 0.420 0.410
Womens Center 0.540 0.589 0.520 0.574
CT Scanner 0.828 0.878 0.792 0.847
MRI 0.626 0.677 0.647 0.703
PET 0.147 0.159 0.189 0.224
Spectroscopy 0.436 0.459 0.472 0.492
Ultrasound 0.844 0.890 0.803 0.858
Diagnostic radiology 0.702 0.750 0.642 0.705
SUM 7.043 7.453 7.035 7.453
Unprofitable Services
OB 0.678 0.696 0.682 0.643
Burn 0.064 0.056 0.073 0.068
Alcohol/drug abuse 0.113 0.135 0.084 0.119
Psychiatric 0.445 0.443 0.253 0.396
Emergency Department 0.865 0.877 0.806 0.840
Trauma Center 0.347 0.322 0.310 0.303
HIV/AIDS Services 0.374 0.435 0.342 0.373
Psych Emergency 0.383 0.441 0.358 0.420
Psych Children 0.255 0.221 0.213 0.204
SUM 3.525 3.627 3.146 3.366
2005-062001-02
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Table 3.9
Discharge-level Mortality and Utilization for Medicare Beneficiaries
By Market Size
Small Large Small Large
Inpatient Quality Indicators
CABG Mortality 0.044 0.048 0.040 0.044
Craniotomy Mortality 0.096 0.091 0.074 0.074
AMI Mortality 0.117 0.130 0.092 0.100
CHF Mortality 0.055 0.050 0.041 0.037
Stroke Mortality 0.125 0.117 0.110 0.103
GI Hemorrhage Mortality 0.039 0.038 0.031 0.029
Hip Fracture Mortality 0.038 0.034 0.031 0.030
Pneumonia mortality 0.082 0.083 0.052 0.051
Utilization measures
Laparoscopic Cholecystectomy 0.670 0.675 0.715 0.720
Incidental Appendectomy 0.024 0.021 0.022 0.019
Bilateral Catheterization 0.093 0.105 0.060 0.079
ICU 0.200 0.236 0.216 0.257
CT Scan 0.283 0.308 0.343 0.379
Diagnostic Radiology 0.802 0.810 0.800 0.820
Other Imaging 0.118 0.123 0.142 0.150
2001-02 2005-06
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Table 3.10
Discharge-level Characteristics of Medicare Beneficiaries
By Market Size
Small Large Small Large
Age 73.4 73.6 72.9 73.1
Sex
Male 0.437 0.431 0.444 0.438
Race
Black 0.082 0.145 0.085 0.154
White 0.872 0.803 0.858 0.782
Hispanic 0.018 0.020 0.022 0.026
Other 0.024 0.028 0.032 0.034
Medicare Status
Disabled 0.153 0.155 0.177 0.177
ESRD 0.032 0.037 0.043 0.050
Home MSA = Hosp MSA 0.760 0.876 0.758 0.875
Admission Type
Emergency 0.508 0.569 0.533 0.606
Urgent 0.232 0.198 0.208 0.174
Elective 0.259 0.230 0.256 0.218
Other coverage
Ever HMO 0.014 0.026 0.030 0.049
All HMO 0.005 0.008 0.007 0.013
Ever Medicaid 0.229 0.248 0.249 0.272
All Medicaid 0.154 0.171 0.174 0.193
2001-02 2005-06
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Chapter 4: Local Uninsurance and Medicare Inpatient Outcomes 
 
This chapter will investigate the relationship between the local uninsurance rate 
and Medicare inpatient outcomes.  It will describe the analytical methods used to identify 
the effect of the uninsurance rate on Medicare mortality from a set of specific condtions 
and procedures.   The results of this analysis will allow for a conclusion as to the ultimate 
role of spillover effects on outcomes for Medicare beneficiaries.   
Chapter 2 detailed a variety of ways in which the uninsurance rate might create 
declines or improvements in various types of quality for Medicare beneficiaries.  An 
increase in uninsurance might result in a reduction in shared quality for Medicare 
beneficiaries, for instance.  On the other hand, more uninsured in an area may allow 
Medicare beneficiaries to obtain better access to care as the number of privately insured 
falls.  Furthermore, decreases in shared quality due to more uninsured could result in 
increases in unique quality provided to Medicare patients.  Finally, a shift in the 
insurance distribution may shift the mix of quality investment across different service 
lines.  By investigating the effect of local uninsurance rates on Medicare mortality, this 
chapter aims to determine the net effect of the above mechanisms on outcomes.  
Additional analyses will be presented in Chapters 5 which will attempt to uncover some 
of the underlying mechanisms by which the uninsured influence the delivery of care to 
Medicare beneficiaries.   
Most studies that have addressed the spillover effects of the uninsured have done 
so using cross-sectional data comparing outcomes of various types in areas with differing 
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levels of uninsurance (Pagan and Pauly, 2006, 2007).  The most common criticism of this 
strategy is that there are unobserved area characteristics that are correlated with both the 
insurance rate and the access or quality outcomes being investigated.  The exogeneity of 
the insurance measure is thus a key assumption in this analysis.  In the cross-sectional 
models, however, the uninsurance rate may be correlated with some unobserved 
characteristics of the market that may also influence Medicare mortality.  One possibility 
is that Medicare beneficiaries in areas with higher uninsurance are more likely to have 
been uninsured prior to obtaining Medicare and thus suffer some of the health 
consequences of their prior uninsurance.  This would bias results on the effects of the 
uninsured on outcomes towards finding a negative impact.     
This study continues to focus on a cross-sectional approach, but will incorporate 
some additional analysis using changes in insurance rates over time in order to determine 
the sensitivity of the results to the analysis approach.  The additional analyses will avoid 
potential confounding from any unobservable time-invariant, market-level characteristics.  
Similarities and inconsistencies in the results from the two different methods will aid in 
our understanding of the true relationship between uninsurance and quality of care.   
While the supplemental longitudinal approach accounts for some endogeneity 
concerns, a plausible story of reverse causation can also be told.  If outcome-enhancing 
quality improvements, high utilization of high intensity services, or investment in large 
fixed cost items in an area are driving up costs and resulting in higher rates of 
uninsurance, a positive relationship between high uninsurance rates and the various 
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outcome measures may arise.  The primary analysis will maintain the assumption of 
exogeneity of the insurance measure and possible extensions will be discussed.  .   
Empirical Approach 
In order to explore the relationship between local uninsurance rates and Medicare 
outcomes, I estimate several discharge-level logistic regression models using individual 
inpatient mortality from a variety of conditions, as the dependent variable.  The primary 
analysis uses the cross-sectional variation in uninsurance rates across the100 sample 
MSAs in 2001 to identify the effect on Medicare outcomes.  Separately for each of eight 
conditions and procedures, I estimate the model below.   
Yijm = Alpha + B1 Um + B2 Pi + B3 Hj + B4 Mm + eijm; 
Y is a binary variable indicating inpatient mortality from the condition of interest.  
Pi are a set of discharge-level controls including age, sex, race and indicators for 30 co-
morbidities designed to control for patient risk (Elixhauser 1998).  Indicators for the 
patient‟s Medicare coverage through disability, managed care and dual coverage by 
Medicaid are also included.  Hj are a set of hospital controls which include hospital 
ownership, size, and teaching and specialty status.  Also included are measures of the 
proportion of Medicare and Medicaid discharges at the hospital-level.  Mm are market-
level controls which include the local rates of Medicare and Medicaid coverage as well as 
per capita income and the number of hospitals in the area.  The market level controls in 
this model were chosen based on the most conservative approach to dealing with 
multicollinearity.  Several sensitivity analyses will also be discussed.  The variable of 
interest is the MSA-level uninsurance rate, Um.  Separate models are estimated on MSAs 
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with over and under 1 million residents and standard errors are clustered at the MSA-
level.   
Baseline Results 
Table 4.1 displays the results of the baseline models described above.  The table presents 
the odds ratios for all of the insurance related variables at both the hospital and market 
level.  The results are presented first for all markets combined, followed by separate 
estimates for small and large markets.  P-values are included and a * represents 
significance at the 5 percent level.  Odds ratios greater than one indicate a positive impact 
on the probability of death and, in the case of the local uninsurance rate, a negative 
spillover effect from the uninsured to Medicare beneficiaries.    
The results for all markets indicate that the uninsurance rate has a negative effect 
on the probability of death, or a positive spillover effect, in three of the eight models; 
craniotomy, stroke and hip fracture.  This may indicate increased access for, or an 
increase in unique quality provided to, Medicare beneficiaries in the presence of more 
uninsured.  A far more consistent result emerges however on the effect of the hospital-
level Medicaid discharge percentage.  Medicare beneficiaries in hospitals with a higher 
proportion of Medicaid patients have an increased probability of death.  This finding is 
consistent across seven of the eight conditions examined.   
 The Medicaid rate at the market-level is also associated with an increased 
probability of death in three of the models.  Interestingly, this relationship exists 
specifically for two of the same conditions where a positive spillover effect of the 
uninsurance rate was found.  In the third case, the effect of the local Medicaid rate is 
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marginally significant.  The effects of hospital- and market-level Medicare rates show 
fewer and less consistent relationship with the outcomes of interest.   
In the case of small markets, the results are quite different.   Negative spillover 
effects of uninsurance, or a positive association between the local uninsurance rate and 
the probability of death are found to be significant in two of the eight models, CABG and 
AMI, and are approaching levels of significance in two others, craniotomy and CHF.  In 
these markets, the effects of hospital-level Medicaid proportions on probability of death 
remain consistently positive, but are significant in only three cases.  Market-level 
Medicaid shows only one negative spillover effect.  Local Medicare rates however show 
significant positive effects on survival in four of the eight models; AMI, CHF, stroke and 
hip fracture. 
 The results for large markets are generally consistent with those for all markets.   
Positive spillover effects of the uninsurance rate are found for the three conditions noted 
above.  Consistent negative spillover effects of hospital-level Medicaid discharge rates 
are found in seven of eight models. 
The models described above intentionally use the most conservative choice of 
market-level covariates with regard to multicollinearity concerns.  Concerns remain 
however about how much of the effects attributed to the uninsurance rate are capturing 
the effects of the local population of poor and minority individuals.  Controls for the local 
race distribution are included in an additional set of analyses to see if it is possible to 
better isolate the effects of the uninsurance rate.  The results are shown in Table 4.2. 
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Several interesting results arise in the analysis incorporating the race distribution.    
In small markets, the negative spillovers on CABG and AMI mortality rates are reduced 
in significance although the result on CABG is still moderately significant.  More 
compelling however is that four additional measures, craniotomy, CHF, stroke and hip 
fracture, now exhibit a negative spillover effect of uninsurance.  This seems to be driven 
by the fact that the proportion Hispanic in the market actually has some positive effects 
on survival for Medicare beneficiaries and its high correlation with the uninsurance rate 
was obscuring these negative effects.  This relationship between the proportion Hispanic 
and Medicare mortality is somewhat less evident in larger markets.  Despite this fact, 
including the race distribution in the large market models also changes the effects of the 
uninsurance rate to be more negative.  In this case however, it merely results in fewer 
positive spillover effects of the uninsured in these models.  When controlling for race, 
there is only one positive spillover effect from the uninsured as opposed to three in the 
original models.     
Sensitivity Analysis  
Measurement error and endogeneity 
 Additional concerns exist regarding the uninsurance measure with regard to 
measurement error and endogeneity.  Because the uninsurance rate is obtained from the 
CPS and thus includes sampling error as well as because the survey was not designed to 
produce local area insurance rates, it is possible that the imprecise measurement of the 
insurance rate could obscure the identification of any spillover effects.  In order to 
address this issue, the poverty rate in the market, which is measured without error from 
the Census and is highly correlated with the uninsurance rate, is used as a proxy for the 
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uninsurance rate in the logistic regression models.  The results of these proxy models are 
show in tables 4.3 and 4.4 which exclude and include the racial distribution from the 
market covariates, respectively.   
 The results in the models without the race distribution, shown in Table 4.3, reveal 
that in small markets the significant negative spillovers are reduced to marginal levels of 
significance when using poverty as a proxy for uninsurance.  In large markets, two of 
three significant positive spillovers from the baseline models are reduced to very 
marginal levels of significance and one remains significant.  In the models with the race 
variables included, replacing the uninsurance rate with the poverty rate results in no 
significant spillovers in small or large markets.  These results suggest that there is more 
information in the uninsurance measure than just a proxy for poverty and that the 
measurement issue is not severely limiting our ability to detect the effects of the 
uninsurance rate.  While the poverty rate might not be a strong candidate for an 
instrument for the uninsurance rate, as it is likely to have its own effects on Medicare 
outcomes, these models may help to address the endogeneity concerns because it is far 
less likely that a reverse causation argument could be made for the impact of the 
mortality rate on the poverty rate in the market.  
Fixed Effects Models 
 Due to concerns that areas with higher levels of uninsurance may have 
unobservable characteristics that could be correlated with Medicare outcomes, this study 
has also taken a longitudinal approach to investigating spillover effects.  While such an 
approach has been common in much of the literature on the spillover effects of managed 
care, the previous work on spillovers related to the uninsured have been exclusively 
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cross-sectional.  Thus, this analysis adds to the cross-sectional results already established, 
but also suggests whether a time series analysis of uninsurance spillovers generates 
consistent results.   
 The analysis is virtually the same as the cross-sectional model with the addition of 
MSA and year specific intercepts.  These intercepts control for time-invariant 
characteristics of the market and general trends in outcomes.  The analysis will thus 
identify the effect of local uninsurance rates on Medicare outcomes using the change in 
the MSA-level uninsurance rate from 2001 to 2005.  All controls are as above.   
Table 4.5 displays the results of the fixed-effects models for the eight conditions 
and procedures.  The results show some consistencies with the cross-sectional results 
along with some discrepancies.  In small markets, six of the eight conditions have an 
odds ratio above one for the local uninsurance rate indicating a negative spillover effect.  
Only the effect for craniotomy is significant however.  The cross-sectional results showed 
two significant negative spillovers for CABG and AMI, but also showed a marginally 
significant negative effect for craniotomy.  The effect of the hospital-level Medicaid 
discharge rate has a negative impact on survival for six of eight conditions.  This differs 
from the cross-sectional results somewhat where these effects were diminished somewhat 
in small markets.  Because the fixed effects model is using the variations within-markets, 
this may explain the discrepancy.   
In large markets, positive spillover effects from the uninsured to Medicare 
beneficiaries are evident on AMI and CHF.  These are different conditions than those that 
showed positive spillovers in the cross-sectional models.  The hospital-level Medicaid 
65 
 
discharge rate has a strong and consistent negative effect on survival.  In these models, 
this result indicates the within-market variation in discharge rates, but not a within-
hospital change in the rate over time.  In these markets, there is also some additional 
evidence to suggest a positive effect of the hospital-level Medicare discharge rate on 
Medicare outcomes.   
Additional analysis was performed including lagged uninsurance rates in an 
attempt to determine whether or not there was a delay in the response by hospitals to 
uninsurance rate changes.  These results are available in Table 4.6.  The main conclusions 
remain very similar, but there is limited evidence that changes in uninsurance in earlier 
periods can have a delayed impact on Medicare outcomes.  These changes vary in the 
direction of impact however.  In some cases, increases in uninsurance in the previous 
period result in improvements in Medicare outcomes in the current period while in other 
cases the prior period uninsurance rate increase results in a decline in Medicare quality in 
the present.   
Market-Level Models 
The main outcomes models were estimated using logistic regressions on 
indicators of individual discharge-level mortality.  These models control for individual, 
hospital and market characteristics in determining the effects of the local uninsurance 
rate.  There are concerns however with using this approach because the variation of 
interest is at the market-level while the model is estimated at the discharge level.  
Standard errors are clustered at the MSA-level in order to control for the correlation in 
the error term between individuals in the same market, but this may not alleviate the 
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problem entirely.  In order to address this concern, risk-adjusted market-level outcomes 
are used to perform the analysis at the market-level.   
Individual-level logistic regressions were estimated on mortality controlling for 
individual characteristics and including MSA-specific intercepts.  These intercepts are 
then converted to predicted probabilities of death and used as market-level risk-adjusted 
mortality rates.  The risk-adjusted mortality rates are then regressed on a set of market-
level characteristics including the uninsurance measure.  These market-level models, like 
the individual-level models, were run both with and without the local race distribution as 
controls.  These models do not adjust for the characteristics of the hospitals used by the 
Medicare beneficiaries in the market as the logistic regressions do however.  The results 
of the market-level models are displayed in Tables 4.7 and 4.8.   
In the baseline models, small markets had two significant negative spillovers on 
CABG and AMI.  In the market level models, the CABG result is significant at the ten 
percent level while the AMI result is less significant but still indicates a negative 
spillover.  In large markets, craniotomy, stroke and hip fracture saw positive spillovers in 
the logistic regressions.  In the market-level models, the craniotomy and stroke results 
also indicate positive spillovers and are significant at least at the ten percent level.  Hip 
fracture shows a very small positive effect without statistical significance.   
Including the race distribution in these models has a similar impact on the results 
to doing so in the logistic regressions.  More negative spillovers emerge in small markets 
which mirrors the logistic regression results.  CHF, stroke and hip fracture show negative 
spillovers in both individual and market-level models while a negative result for 
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craniotomy disappears but another on CABG emerges in the market level models.  A 
similar pattern emerges for the large markets.  A significant positive spillover on stroke 
becomes only marginally significant in the market level model while two marginal 
results, craniotomy and pneumonia, from the individual models are significant in the 
market level models.  While there is some loss of significance in the market-level models 
that could be consistent with underestimates of the standard errors on the market-level 
variables, the results remain generally consistent with those in the discharge level models.   
Discussion  
 The analysis of the impact of local uninsurance rates on Medicare inpatient 
mortality reveals both positive and negative spillover effects from the uninsured to 
Medicare beneficiaries.  This is not inconsistent with expectations as the hypothesis 
regarding the effect of local uninsurance on outcomes was ambiguous.  The original 
results in small markets showed two significant negative spillovers from the uninsured to 
Medicare beneficiaries.  When incorporating the effects of the race distribution into the 
models, however, the negative spillovers become more pronounced with four conditions 
exhibiting significant negative effects.  In this case, it appears that the proportion 
Hispanic in the market exhibits a positive impact on survival for Medicare beneficiaries 
and in turn reveals the more negative impact of the uninsurance rate.  Some concerns 
exist with including the highly correlated race and insurance distributions in the same 
model at the risk of introducing multicollinearity, but not including the additional 
variables does not allow us to isolate the impact of the uninsurance rate independent of 
the proportion minority.  The results including the race distribution are thus interpreted 
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with caution, but also as the best estimate of the unique relationship between the local 
uninsurance rate and Medicare mortality. 
 Including the poverty rate in place of the uninsurance rate in an effort to address 
both measurement error and endogeneity concerns resulted in few significant results 
particularly in the presence of the race distribution. The differences across market size are 
also less pronounced when using the poverty rate as a proxy for uninsurance.  These 
results indicate that the poverty rate and the racial distribution in the market are capturing 
very similar relationships with Medicare mortality.  The uninsurance rate, on the other 
hand, appears to have a unique relationship with Medicare quality, at least somewhat 
independently of race and income.  This relationship also varies very clearly by market 
size while the effects of poverty and race see less variation on this dimension.   
 As opposed to the negative spillovers in small markets, positive spillover effects 
were identified on three conditions in the baseline models in large markets, but again, 
adding the race variables resulted in more negative impacts of the uninsurance rate itself 
on Medicare mortality.  Only one positive spillover effect remains when controlling for 
race.  Further evidence of the negative spillovers in small markets and positive spillovers 
in large markets also emerges in models which identify the effects using changes in the 
local uninsurance rate over time.  This introduces further endogeneity controls and while 
the results are somewhat weaker in both small and large markets, the general trends are 
consistent with the primary results.  The same holds true for models which examine the 
effects of local uninsurance on risk-adjusted mortality rates at the market level.  Again, 
these results are not as strong as the results on discharge-level mortality, but small 
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markets generally show more negative spillover effects while large markets are more 
likely to exhibit positive spillovers.  Furthermore, the market-level models do not control 
for hospital characteristics and the results may indicate that Medicare beneficiaries in 
areas with more uninsured tend to frequent higher quality hospital types. 
Overall, both the primary results and the sensitivity analyses are generally 
consistent with the expectation that negative spillover effects are more likely to occur in 
smaller markets.  These spillover effects may be caused by reductions in shared quality in 
response to a lack of demand by uninsured individuals.  This would be enhanced by the 
lower demand inherent in the smaller markets.  The presence of positive spillover effects 
in larger markets may be the result of better access to care for Medicare beneficiaries in 
the presence of more uninsured or of increases in unique quality used to compensate for 
declines in shared quality in response to more uninsured.  The possible mechanisms 
behind the results on outcomes will be investigated further in the following chapter. 
One additional result of the outcomes models deserves further discussion 
however.  The very consistent negative effect of the hospital-level Medicaid rate on 
Medicare mortality is quite interesting.  It may indicate something unobserved about the 
income or health status of the Medicare beneficiaries themselves if those that share a 
hospital with a high proportion of Medicaid patients are lower-income or in poorer 
health.  This seems less likely however due to the fact that the effect is far more 
consistent in large markets.  This may indicate that hospitals in large markets have 
greater variation in the proportion of Medicaid beneficiaries they see thus indicating that 
those hospitals „specializing‟ in Medicaid beneficiaries are in fact lower quality hospitals.  
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When Medicare beneficiaries choose such hospitals they suffer the consequences.  This 
finding deserves much greater attention going forward.   
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Chapter 5:  Local Uninsurance and Shared and Unique Quality 
 
In the previous chapter, we considered the effect of local uninsurance rates on 
outcomes of a variety of conditions and procedures for Medicare beneficiaries.  The 
results showed some evidence of spillover effects, both negative and positive, but the 
results could not be considered staggering.  The conceptual framework described in 
Chapter 2 suggested that there were a number of mechanisms through which the 
uninsured could affect the delivery of care to Medicare beneficiaries.  A high local 
uninsurance rate is predicted to reduce the shared quality of care delivered to all payers 
while increases in the unique quality of care provided to Medicare beneficiaries are 
expected.  This chapter will investigate these individual mechanisms by examining how 
the uninsurance rate affects shared quality in the form of the availability of hospital 
services in a market and how it affects unique quality by exploring the utilization of care 
by Medicare beneficiaries.     
Effects on Shared Quality 
Because uninsured individuals have lower demand for health care services, it was 
hypothesized that areas with more uninsured will not have sufficient demand to support 
certain services and that this may result in a reduction in shared quality for Medicare 
beneficiaries.  Such an effect is likely to be especially significant in smaller markets.  
Furthermore, the uninsured may not only affect the number of services available, but 
likely the service mix as well.  The potential effect in this case is less clear however.  
While the uninsured themselves demand lower cost and potentially less profitable 
services, the reduced demand that they inflict on the hospital may also enhance a 
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provider‟s incentives to offer more profitable services in an effort to subsidize losses due 
to the uninsured.  This section will investigate the impact of the local uninsurance rate on 
the provision of a variety of services at the hospital level.   
 As in Chapter 4, the primary analysis uses the cross-sectional variation in the 
uninsurance rate to identify the effects on hospital service availability.  A sensitivity 
analysis using a long-difference approach and thus using the changes in uninsurance over 
time to identify the effects is also performed.  Unlike the previous analysis, most of the 
analysis in this section is performed at the hospital-level using data from the American 
Hospital Association (AHA) annual survey.  A sensitivity analysis using the provision of 
services at the market-level is also explored.   
Based on work by Horwitz (2005) and Horwitz and Nichols (2009), a set of 15 profitable 
and 9 unprofitable services are defined.  Profitable services include PICU, NICU, 
catheterization labs, cardiac surgery, a variety of imaging technology as well as women‟s 
centers, sports medicine and fitness centers.  Unprofitable services include obstetrics, 
burn units, substance abuse treatment units, emergency departments, trauma centers, 
AIDS units and a variety of psychiatric services.  The full list of services is available in 
Table 3.7.     
Using the AHA data on all community hospitals in the 100 sample MSAs, I 
estimate the following model to determine the impact of the local uninsurance rate on the 
provision of hospital services.  
Yjm = A + B1 Um + B2 Hj + B3 Mm + eijm; 
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Y is the number of hospital services provided by hospital j, grouped into several 
categories.  All twenty-four services are collapsed into nine categories (0, 1-3, 4-6, 7-9, 
10-12,13-15,16-18, 19-21, 22-24).  The fifteen profitable services are grouped into six 
categories and the nine unprofitable services are grouped into four categories in the same 
manner as described above.  The models are then estimated using an ordered logit 
technique.  Hj is a set of hospital characteristics including ownership, bed size, specialty 
status, and teaching status.  The Medicaid and Medicare discharge rates at the hospital 
level are also included.  Mm is a set of market-level characteristics including the Medicare 
and Medicaid rates, per capita income, the number of hospitals and the population.  
Standard errors are clustered at the MSA-level to account for correlation between the 
error terms of hospitals in the same market.  Separate models are estimated for all 
services, profitable services and unprofitable services as well for markets with over and 
under one million people.   
Baseline Results 
 The results of the ordered logit models are displayed in Table 5.1.  The results for 
all services in all markets indicate a negative relationship between the uninsurance rate 
and the number of services provided by a hospital in the market.  When broken down by 
market size, large markets also show a negative and significant effect of the uninsurance 
rate on the number of services provided by a hospital.  Small markets however show a 
negative but insignificant effect of the uninsurance rate on the provision of hospital 
services.  These results vary somewhat when the services are disaggregated into a set of 
profitable and unprofitable services.   No significant effect of the uninsurance rate on the 
provision of profitable services emerges in small or large markets, but a consistent 
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negative effect of the uninsurance rate on the number of unprofitable services exists 
across market sizes.  In fact, the magnitude of the effect of the uninsurance rate on the 
provision of unprofitable services is almost twice as large in small markets as it is in large 
markets.   
In small markets, the hospital-level Medicaid rate is associated with more 
profitable and unprofitable services.  The market-level Medicaid rate is associated with 
fewer profitable services however.  In large markets, the hospital-level Medicaid rate is 
associated with fewer profitable services and more unprofitable services.  The hospital 
Medicare rate is associated with fewer of both types of services.   
Table 5.2 examines the results of the same set of ordered logit models with the 
addition of the market-level race distribution as covariates.  Including the race 
distribution in these models as a means to better isolate the effects of the uninsurance rate 
on the provision of hospital services reveals substantially different results.  The 
uninsurance rate no longer exhibits any significant relationship with the provision of 
hospital services when all services are analyzed together.  This result appears to be driven 
by the significant negative association between the proportion minority in the market and 
the provision of hospital services.  In all markets combined, the proportion other race has 
a significant negative effect on the provision of services while the proportion black and 
Hispanic have marginally significant negative effects.  In small markets, only the 
proportion other race is statistically significant while in large markets all three minority 
race proportions have a negative effect on the provision of services.  As was the case in 
the models without the race distribution, there are no significant effects of the proportion 
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uninsured on the provision of profitable services in any market size.  The inclusion of the 
race variables does reverse the sign of the coefficients on the uninsurance rate in the 
models of profitable service provision however.  Previously, the effects of uninsurance on 
profitable services appeared negative but insignificant while in the presence of the race 
variables the relationship is positive but still insignificant.  Again, this appears to be 
driven by negative effects of the proportion minority on the provision of profitable 
services.  This relationship is more pronounced in large markets than in small. 
The association between the uninsurance rate and the provision of unprofitable 
services remains negative and significant in the presence of the race distribution when 
examining all market combined.  The results are still negative, but no longer significant 
in small and large markets however.  The magnitude of the effect in small markets is still 
much larger than that in large markets however and far closer to standard levels of 
statistical significance with a p-value of 0.126. 
Sensitivity Analysis 
Poverty as a proxy for uninsurance 
 As in the analysis in Chapter 4, both measurement error and endogeneity concerns 
related to the uninsurance rate encourage a sensitivity analysis that replaces the 
uninsurance rate in the models of service provision with the poverty rate in the market.  
The two measures are highly correlated and collinearity concerns prevent them from 
being used in the same models.  The poverty rate however is measured without error 
using Census data thus eliminating measurement error.  Its ability to alleviate any 
endogeneity concerns that unobservable market-level characteristics are correlated with 
both the uninsurance measure and the provision of services may be less convincing than 
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in the case of the outcomes models however.  Nonetheless, this analysis provides further 
evidence of the impact of low market demand on the provision of services in the market 
using the poverty rate to identify this low demand. 
 Table 5.3 displays the results of the analysis using the poverty rate as a proxy for 
uninsurance.  As was the case for uninsurance rates, the poverty rate has a negative 
impact on the provision of the set of all services.  The magnitudes of the effects of 
poverty rates are considerably larger than those for uninsurance however and the negative 
effect in small markets is significant for poverty where it was not for uninsurance.  This 
general trend holds true when disaggregating the set of services into profitable and 
unprofitable services as well.  The poverty rate has negative effects on the provision of 
both profitable and unprofitable services although the effects on both types in small 
markets are marginally significant at best.  Like the results for uninsurance, the negative 
effects on unprofitable services are stronger.  Unlike the results on uninsurance however, 
the effect of poverty on the provision of unprofitable services is larger in large markets.  
 Including the race distribution in these models captures some of the negative 
effects of the poverty rate much as it did in the models using uninsurance.  These results 
are displayed in Table 5.4.  The effects of the poverty rate are diminished in the presence 
of controls for market-level race characteristics.  Significant negative effects of the 
poverty rate remain on the provision of unprofitable services, but again, these effects are 
strongest in large markets unlike in the models using the uninsurance measure.   
Long Difference Models 
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In an effort to further explore the relationship between the local uninsurance rate 
and the provision of hospital services, long-difference models were estimated on the set 
of general hospitals that were present in both 2001 and 2005.  The change in the number 
of services provided by a hospital is estimated by OLS as a function of initial period 
hospital characteristics and changes in the local insurance rates and hospital discharge 
rates as well as market-level population and income.  These models will identify the 
response of hospital service provision to the change in the uninsurance rate from 2001 to 
2005.   
The results are in Table 5.5.  The findings are fairly unimpressive and the models 
themselves are quite weak.  The change in the uninsurance rate is not a significant 
predictor of the change in the number of services provided of any type or in any market 
size.  In fact, the lone coefficient of interest is the hospital-level Medicaid discharge rate.  
As the proportion of Medicaid discharges in the hospital grows over time, the number of 
profitable services a hospital offers increases in all markets combined.  No significant 
results remain when the markets are split by size however.   
Market-level service provision 
 The results above are all estimated at the hospital-level and identify the effects of 
the market-level characteristics on a hospital‟s provision of services.  In the interest of 
gaining a better understanding of the effect of the local uninsurance rate on the 
availability of services in the market as a whole, market-level models of the provision of 
individual services are estimated.  A subset of the services used in the hospital-level 
models is used for this analysis.  The chosen set of services includes obstetrics services, 
emergency departments, psychiatric services, AIDS services, cardiac catheterization 
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services, cardiac surgery, MRIs and CT scanners.  These services were chosen in part 
because they are a mix of profitable and unprofitable services but also because these 
services had desirable statistical properties for linear estimation.  The sum of the number 
of hospitals in the market providing a service is obtained and adjusted to reflect the 
service provision per 10,000 residents.  The service provision per capita is then used as 
the dependent variable in OLS models of market-level service availability controlling for 
the insurance distribution, per capita income, and the number of hospitals at the market-
level. The results of these models are displayed in Table 5.6.    
 In all markets and in large markets, four of the eight services examined show 
reduced availability in markets with higher uninsurance rates.  These are predominantly 
services that were categorized as unprofitable, OB, psych and AIDS, but also include CT 
scans which were categorized as part of the profitable service group.  Interestingly, in 
smaller markets no significant effects of uninsurance on service provision emerge.  These 
models are also run with controls for the local race distribution as covariates and the 
results are shown in Table 5.7.  The findings are quite interesting.  In the presence of 
controls for the race distribution, the effect of the uninsurance rate on market-level 
service provision is generally positive and is at least marginally significant for six of 
eight services in small markets (p-values below 0.12). Unlike the models at the hospital-
level, these models do not control for the characteristics of the hospitals themselves but 
only for the market-level characteristics discussed.  When adding some controls for the 
distribution of hospital types in the market (not shown), the positive effects of 
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uninsurance disappear.  This result is driven by a stronger presence of for-profit hospitals 
in small markets with high levels of uninsurance. 
Discussion 
 The above analyses of the effect of the local uninsurance rate on the provision of 
hospital services reveal some interesting patterns.  Most generally, there is evidence of a 
negative association between uninsurance at the market-level and the provision of 
hospital services.  This is consistent with the expectation that a higher uninsurance rate 
and thus lower demand for services would result in reductions in shared quality.  The 
negative effects of uninsurance on the number of services provided by a hospital appear 
to be driven primarily by a reduction in the number of unprofitable services provided.  
While no formal hypothesis emerged regarding the effects of uninsurance on the mix of 
services provided, this result is intuitively appealing.  If a hospital is forced to cut back on 
shared elements of quality in response to more uninsured, the services generating the 
least excess revenue would seem a logical choice. 
 Controlling for the distribution of races at the market-level in an effort to isolate 
the unique effect of uninsurance on hospital service provision, further enhances our 
understanding of this relationship.  The negative relationship between uninsurance and 
service provision is significantly diminished when controlling for the race distribution.  It 
appears that the percent minority in a market captures much of the negative impact that 
the uninsurance rate displayed in the original models.  The effects are particularly 
pronounced however on the provision of profitable services.  The uninsurance rate alone 
exhibited negative but insignificant effects on profitable services.  In the presence of the 
race distribution however, the effects are opposite in sign though still insignificant.  
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These results seem to indicate that the purer effect of the uninsurance rate is positive on 
profitable services but still negative on unprofitable services.  In other words, the 
uninsurance rate is affecting not just sheer numbers of services but is having an impact on 
service mix as well. 
 Substituting poverty for uninsurance in these models also reveals more about 
these relationships.  The effects of poverty on hospital service provision are stronger and 
in many cases more significant than those of uninsurance.  When the race distribution is 
controlled for in these models however the significance of the negative effects does 
decline.  The positive, though insignificant, effects of uninsurance on profitable services, 
particularly in small markets are not nearly as pronounced in models using poverty as a 
proxy.  As was the case in the outcomes models in the previous chapter, the results 
indicate that the uninsurance rate is capturing a relationship with hospital services that is 
not perfectly correlated with the effects of race and poverty.  In this case, it appears that 
the uninsurance rate has a stronger effect on the mix of profitable versus unprofitable 
services than the other market level characteristics.  This result is further confirmed in the 
market-level models which find marginally significant positive effects of the uninsurance 
rate on the provision of several individual services.   
 Long-difference models do not show any effects of a change in the uninsurance 
rate on the change in the number of services provided at the hospital-level.  This may be 
due to the fact that this is a relatively short timeframe over which changes in the 
distribution of services would be unlikely.  Altogether, these results suggest that the 
uninsurance rate does have an effect on shared quality that is not limited to a negative 
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impact on the total number of services provided.  Instead, the uninsurance rate appears to 
influence the mix of services provided with consistent negative effects on unprofitable 
services and some evidence of positive effects on profitable services. 
Effects on Unique Quality 
This chapter explores the mechanisms driving any potential spillover effects of 
uninsurance.  The previous section examined the relationship between local uninsurance 
rates and hospital service availability in an effort to determine the effect of uninsurance 
on the shared quality available in a market.  This section will address the question of how 
local uninsurance rates affect the unique quality delivered to Medicare beneficiaries by 
analyzing their utilization patterns.   
Chapter 2 suggested at least two ways in which local uninsurance rates could 
affect Medicare utilization.  When uninsurance rises and private coverage falls, a 
provider may respond by effectively lowering the price at which they will accept 
Medicare patients or shifting some of their capacity towards Medicare.  This could result 
in increased Medicare utilization.  Furthermore, if a high uninsurance rate decreases the 
level of shared quality available, a provider may compensate Medicare beneficiaries for 
the loss of shared quality by increasing their unique quality.  This is likely to include 
additional utilization of variable cost elements of quality.  Exploring the effects of the 
uninsurance rate on Medicare utilization may also aid in understanding one of the 
mechanisms behind the results on outcomes.  Furthermore, the analysis of Medicare 
utilization will tie this analysis to the work on geographic variations in care.  Much 
research has discussed the geographic variations in utilization by Medicare beneficiaries, 
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but no studies have considered whether the local insurance distribution contributes to 
these variations.   
The utilization measures used to test the hypothesis on unique quality are limited 
in that they must be obtained from the Medicare discharge data.  Three utilization 
measures are included among the AHRQ Quality Indicators as indicators of potential 
overuse of services.  These are laparoscopic cholecystectomy (LC), incidental 
appendectomy and bilateral catheterization.  The other measures used in this analysis are 
obtained from the discharge data and include ICU use and several indicators for the use 
of diagnostic technology.  These elements were chosen because they are often discussed 
in the work on geographic variations as elements of care that are overused and driven by 
supply with no associated improvement in outcomes.  This section explores whether any 
of the variation in use may be explained by the insurance distribution.  Market-level 
measures of hospital admissions and the proportion of those admissions from Medicare 
and Medicaid are also considered as measures of market-level utilization.   
The primary analysis in this section will explore the relationship between local 
uninsurance rates and individual-level measures of Medicare utilization.  I estimate 
several discharge-level logistic regression models using individual inpatient utilization as 
the dependent variable.  This analysis uses the variation in uninsurance rates across our 
100 sample MSAs in 2001 to identify the effect on Medicare utilization.  Separately for 
each of seven utilization measures, I estimate the model below;   
Yijm = Alpha + Beta1 Um + B2 Pi + B3 Hj + B4 Mm + eijm; 
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Y is a binary variable indicating inpatient utilization of a particular service.  Pi are 
a set of discharge-level controls including age, sex, race and indicators for 30 co-
morbidities designed to control for patient risk (Elixhauser 1998).  Indicators for the 
patient‟s Medicare coverage through disability, managed care and dual coverage by 
Medicaid are also included.  Hj are a set of hospital controls which include hospital 
ownership, size, and teaching and specialty status.  Also included are measures of the 
proportion of Medicare and Medicaid discharges at the hospital-level.  Mm are market-
level controls which include the local rates of Medicare and Medicaid coverage as well as 
per capita income and the number of hospitals in the area.  The variable of interest is the 
MSA-level uninsurance rate, Um.  Separate models are estimated on MSAs with over and 
under 1 million residents and standard errors are clustered at the MSA-level.   
Baseline Results 
Table 5.8 displays the results of the discharge-level utilization models for 
Medicare beneficiaries.  These models, as described above, test the relationship between 
a high uninsurance rate and the probability of using a variety of services.  In the models 
where all markets are pooled together, the local uninsurance rate has a positive 
relationship with utilization for three of the seven services modeled; LC, ICU and other 
imaging.  These results are relatively consistent across market size although the 
significance level is lost for LC in small markets.   
The hospital-level Medicaid percentage has a negative impact on use in two of 
seven models with the results pooled across market size and in three of seven models in 
large markets.  The results are significant for LC and CT scan and for other imaging only 
in large markets.  In small markets however, no significant results emerge with the 
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exception of one marginally significant positive result on diagnostic radiology.  Market-
level Medicaid had no impact on utilization measures. 
As in the analysis of inpatient outcomes and hospital service provision, the race 
distribution is added to these models as a covariate in an attempt to further isolate the 
impact of the uninsurance rate on utilization by Medicare beneficiaries.  The results of 
these models are shown in Table 5.9.  Adding the race distribution diminishes the 
positive effects of uninsurance on utilization.  In small markets, only two measures 
exhibit marginally significant positive effects after controlling for race while in large 
markets no significant positive effects of uninsurance remain.  One marginally significant 
negative effect of uninsurance on use emerges in large markets on the appendectomy 
measure.  
Sensitivity Analysis 
Poverty as proxy for uninsurance 
 In order to address issues of measurement error and endogeneity as well as to be 
consistent with the previous analyses, the poverty rate is again used as a proxy for the 
uninsurance rate in an additional set of analyses.  The models that do not control for the 
distribution of race show somewhat stronger evidence of a positive effect of the poverty 
rate on Medicare utilization than was the case when using the uninsurance rate.  These 
results are more consistent in large markets and are shown in Table 5.10.  Including the 
race distribution leads to fewer positive and significant effects of the poverty rate on 
Medicare utilization and also identifies several negative and significant impacts of 
poverty on use in smaller markets.  These results are displayed in Table 5.11. 
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Fixed effects models 
To deal with the possible endogeneity of the insurance measure as well as to 
better understand the relationship between local uninsurance rates and utilization, the 
change in the uninsurance rate over time is also used to identify the effects on utilization 
in a set of fixed effects models.  The model is virtually the same as the cross-sectional 
model with the addition of MSA and year specific intercepts.  These intercepts control for 
time-invariant characteristics of the market and general trends in utilization.  The analysis 
thus identifies the effect of local uninsurance rates on Medicare utilization using the 
change in the MSA-level uninsurance rate from 2001 to 2005.  All controls are as above.   
 The results of the MSA fixed effects models are shown in Table 5.12  They are 
much less consistent across market size as well as within individual measures than the 
cross-sectional results.  For all markets together, the effect of the local uninsurance rate 
on utilization is negative for the two models on ICU use and incidental appendectomy.  In 
smaller markets, one positive effect of uninsurance on use emerges for bilateral 
catheterization, while in large markets, the effects are negative for incidental 
appendectomy and diagnostic radiology.   
 Hospital-level Medicaid discharge percentages also show a negative relationship 
with Medicare utilization on three of the seven measures; LC, CT scan and other 
imaging.  None of the measures show a significant relationship with hospital Medicaid 
rates in smaller markets.  In larger markets, the three measures noted above along with 
diagnostic radiology all show a negative association.  Market-level Medicaid rates show 
two negative effects in all markets with only one being significant in small markets and 
none in large markets. 
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Market-level utilization 
The above analyses primarily test the hypothesis that the unique quality delivered 
to Medicare beneficiaries is higher in the presence of more uninsured.  By examining 
market-level admissions and the distribution of those admissions by payer type, this 
sensitivity analysis will also examine the hypothesis that more uninsured in a market 
increases access for Medicare beneficiaries or shifts capacity toward these beneficiaries.  
The first element of the analysis seeks to determine whether a larger proportion of 
uninsured individuals in the market affects the total number of hospital admissions in the 
market.  We know that uninsured individuals use less care than their insured counterparts 
so we might expect the total number of admissions controlling for population size to be 
lower in markets with more uninsured.  In order to examine this question, I estimate the 
model below of the total number of admissions in the MSA as a function of the insurance 
distribution in the area, the per capita income, the population and the racial distribution.   
Admitm = Um + Carem + Caidm + Popm + Racem + Incm + em; 
The dependent variable is the logged number of admissions in the market.  The 
model is estimated by OLS and the variables of interest are the proportions of uninsured, 
Um, Medicaid, Caidm, and Medicare, Carem, in the market.  This is obviously a simple 
model and importantly leaves out any measures of the health status of the population.  
Nonetheless, it is considered an interesting exploration of the issue of how uninsurance 
might affect market-level utilization.  Similar models are estimated using the proportion 
of admissions from Medicare and Medicaid as the dependent variable.   
96 
 
 The results of the market-level analysis on total usage are presented in Table 5.13.  
They suggest that total utilization is largely determined by population in the market.  The 
Medicare rate in the market does have a positive impact on use likely owing to the age of 
the population and its health status which is not otherwise controlled for in this model.  
The uninsurance rate does not have a significant impact on the total number of 
admissions in the market.  This might suggest that a lower level of utilization for the 
uninsured is compensated for by higher levels of use for other payers leaving total use 
unchanged.  The second and third columns of Table 5.13 display the results of the local 
uninsurance rate on the proportion of admissions in the market from Medicare and 
Medicaid, respectively.  Neither shows a significant increase in response to a higher 
uninsurance rate.   In fact, the impact of the local uninsurance rate on the proportion of 
admissions from Medicare is negative with a p-value of 0.129, not unreasonably far from 
standard definitions of statistical significance.  An increase in the proportion of 
admissions from the privately insured in response to more uninsured is thus a possibility. 
The market-level Medicaid rate also has no impact on the total number of 
admissions in the market.  Interestingly enough, it does have an impact on both the 
proportion of admissions from Medicaid, as would be expected, but also on the 
proportion of admissions from Medicare.  This is similar to the result we might have 
expected for the uninsured.  An increase in the proportion of Medicaid in the market 
seems to have a spillover effect on utilization by Medicare beneficiaries.  These results 
do not exhibit particularly meaningful differences across market size however. 
Discussion 
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The analysis of the impact of the local uninsurance rate on utilization by Medicare 
beneficiaries reveals some consistencies with expectations as well as a few discrepancies.  
An increase in use in response to more uninsured was predicted if shared quality in the 
market declines in response to the uninsured or if providers increase access for Medicare 
beneficiaries in the presence of fewer private payers.  The results on market-level 
admissions show no evidence that access is enhanced for Medicare beneficiaries in 
response to more uninsured. The most general result on individual utilization shows that 
in the cross-section Medicare beneficiaries in areas with more uninsured use more 
services, but the significance of this result in diminished when controlling for the race 
distribution.   
The sensitivity analysis using poverty as a proxy for uninsurance showed stronger 
positive effects of poverty on utilization in the absence of the race distribution, but 
weaker evidence of these effects when race is included in the model, compared to the 
models using the uninsurance rate.  In fact, the poverty rate exhibits a significant negative 
impact on utilization of three services by Medicare beneficiaries in the presence of 
controls for race.  Given the lack of negative effects of the uninsurance rate, it does 
appear that uninsurance is capturing a more positive relationship with utilization than 
would be indicated by poverty and race alone.  This is more evident in small markets than 
in large.  Furthermore, the fixed effects models also indicate more positive effects of the 
local uninsurance rate on utilization in small markets and more negative impacts in large 
markets.  Therefore, the analysis, as a whole, exhibits weak support for the hypothesis 
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that the local uninsurance rate is associated with higher utilization by Medicare 
beneficiaries. 
Conclusions 
 This chapter explored the relationship between local uninsurance rates and the 
provision of hospital services as well as the utilization of specific services by Medicare 
beneficiaries.  The prediction that higher uninsurance rates will result in lower shared 
quality, as measured by the availability of hospital services, is generally supported by this 
analysis.  The local uninsurance rate has a negative association with the provision of 
hospital services and this relationship is driven primarily by a reduction in the provision 
of unprofitable services in response to more uninsured.  While the evidence of an effect 
of the uninsured on service provision is weaker after controlling for the distribution of 
race in the market, negative effects on the provision of unprofitable services remain 
significant.   
In addition to the effect on the number of unprofitable services provided, the 
results also provide weaker evidence that the uninsurance rate has a positive effect on the 
number of profitable services provided by a hospital.  This indicates that hospitals in 
markets with more uninsured may respond to financial pressure not only by reducing 
service provision but by shifting the mix of services provided to a more profitable set.  
The net effect on the shared quality in the market is therefore ambiguous especially given 
that the services analyzed here are merely a subset of the many services that hospitals 
must choose to provide or not provide to their patients. 
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In the presence of reductions in the shared quality of care provided, increases in 
the unique quality provided to Medicare beneficiaries were predicted.  The analysis in 
this chapter shows some evidence that those Medicare beneficiaries in markets with more 
uninsured use more services including ICU days and other imaging technology.  Again, 
these results are weaker when the effects of the race distribution in the market are also 
controlled for in the analysis.  The results are relatively consistent with the results on 
shared quality however in that small markets show stronger evidence of a decline in the 
provision of unprofitable services and in turn also show stronger evidence of the possibly 
compensating increases in service use by Medicare beneficiaries.  Large markets exhibit 
less significant effects on both the hospital provision of unprofitable services and on the 
individual utilization of specific services.  The result that indicates an increase in the 
provision of profitable services in the presence of more uninsured may also have an effect 
on the individual utilization of specific services.  This result is at least plausibly 
consistent with the evidence for increased utilization in the presence of more uninsured.   
This chapter provides suggestive evidence that supports the proposed mechanisms 
by which the uninsured can affect the quality of care delivered to Medicare beneficiaries.  
A higher uninsurance rate is associated with some reductions in the provision of shared 
quality as well as some increases in the provision of unique quality to Medicare 
beneficiaries.  The following chapter will summarize and discuss these results in 
conjunction with the findings on the impact of uninsurance on the outcomes of care for 
Medicare beneficiaries.  
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Table 5.1
The Effect of Local Uninsurance on Hospital Service Availability
By Market Size
Coef. P-val Coef. P-val Coef. P-val
All Markets
Uninsurance rate -0.046 0.000 * -0.021 0.123 -0.061 0.000 *
Medicaid
Hospital-level 0.012 0.122 -0.008 0.212 0.034 0.000 *
Market-level -0.017 0.445 -0.032 0.000 * -0.044 0.110
Medicare
Hospital-level -0.030 0.000 * -0.015 0.519 -0.015 0.009 *
Market-level 0.002 0.933 0.010 0.672 0.022 0.378
Small Markets
Uninsurance rate -0.035 0.247 -0.002 0.962 -0.096 0.005 *
Medicaid
Hospital-level 0.061 0.000 * 0.050 0.006 * 0.061 0.007 *
Market-level -0.057 0.034 * -0.060 0.022 * -0.072 0.118
Medicare
Hospital-level -0.010 0.334 -0.016 0.122 -0.001 0.964
Market-level -0.047 0.045 * -0.037 0.177 -0.022 0.384
Large Markets
Uninsurance rate -0.045 0.001 * -0.018 0.246 -0.055 0.006 *
Medicaid
Hospital-level 0.008 0.321 -0.014 0.023 * 0.034 0.000 *
Market-level -0.038 0.404 -0.010 0.802 -0.058 0.180
Medicare
Hospital-level -0.033 0.000 * -0.035 0.000 * -0.017 0.014 *
Market-level 0.019 0.566 0.024 0.487 0.044 0.159
Profitable Services Unprofitable ServicesAll Services
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Table 5.2
The Effect of Local Uninsurance on Hospital Service Availability
By Market Size
Coef. P-val Coef. P-val Coef. P-val
All Markets
Uninsurance rate -0.012 0.542 0.013 0.585 -0.058 0.011 *
Medicaid
Hospital-level 0.012 0.117 -0.008 0.210 0.034 0.000 *
Market-level -0.006 0.762 -0.005 0.816 -0.041 0.111
Medicare
Hospital-level -0.031 0.000 * -0.033 0.000 * -0.016 0.008 *
Market-level -0.004 0.856 0.007 0.757 0.016 0.529
Race
Hispanic -0.013 0.114 -0.015 0.101 0.004 0.674
Black -0.013 0.082 -0.010 0.229 -0.006 0.484
Other -0.028 0.000 * -0.011 0.029 * -0.031 0.010 *
Small Markets
Uninsurance rate 0.002 0.967 0.037 0.577 -0.098 0.126
Medicaid
Hospital-level 0.060 0.001 * 0.050 0.007 * 0.061 0.009 *
Market-level -0.047 0.051 -0.053 0.053 -0.066 0.129
Medicare
Hospital-level -0.012 0.276 -0.017 0.121 -0.002 0.895
Market-level -0.059 0.014 * -0.043 0.144 -0.029 0.272
Race
Hispanic -0.012 0.375 -0.015 0.361 0.003 0.869
Black -0.006 0.665 0.005 0.811 -0.005 0.734
Other -0.025 0.000 * -0.009 0.145 -0.025 0.000
Large Markets
Uninsurance rate 0.025 0.260 0.038 0.202 -0.024 0.401
Medicaid
Hospital-level 0.009 0.274 -0.014 0.026 * 0.035 0.000 *
Market-level -0.033 0.374 -0.015 0.692 -0.043 0.317
Medicare
Hospital-level -0.034 0.000 * -0.035 0.000 * -0.018 0.011 *
Market-level 0.012 0.678 0.024 0.448 0.030 0.315
Race
Hispanic -0.026 0.005 * -0.026 0.022 * 0.000 0.984
Black -0.029 0.000 * -0.023 0.010 * -0.017 0.121
Other -0.048 0.001 * -0.014 0.425 -0.069 0.002 *
All Services Profitable Services Unprofitable Services
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Table 5.3
The Effect of Local Poverty on Hospital Service Availability
By Market Size
Coef. P-val Coef. P-val Coef. P-val
All Markets
Percent poverty -0.091 0.001 * -0.045 0.083 -0.117 0.000 *
Medicaid
Hospital-level 0.012 0.116 -0.008 0.205 0.034 0.000 *
Market-level 0.016 0.481 0.000 0.997 -0.003 0.890
Medicare
Hospital-level -0.030 0.000 * -0.032 0.000 * -0.015 0.011 *
Market-level 0.020 0.384 0.018 0.428 0.044 0.088
Small Markets
Percent poverty -0.050 0.039 * -0.041 0.129 -0.062 0.094
Medicaid
Hospital-level 0.062 0.000 * 0.051 0.006 * 0.059 0.009 *
Market-level -0.046 0.108 -0.052 0.092 -0.058 0.242
Medicare
Hospital-level -0.010 0.355 -0.016 0.146 -0.001 0.922
Market-level -0.043 0.067 -0.037 0.170 -0.016 0.611
Large Markets
Percent poverty -0.152 0.000 * -0.074 0.048 * -0.172 0.000 *
Medicaid
Hospital-level 0.007 0.325 -0.014 0.020 * 0.033 0.000 *
Market-level 0.013 0.718 0.012 0.759 -0.004 0.910
Medicare
Hospital-level -0.033 0.000 * -0.035 0.000 * -0.017 0.016 *
Market-level 0.041 0.141 0.033 0.290 0.070 0.016
All Services Profitable Services Unprofitable Services
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Table 5.4
The Effect of Local Poverty on Hospital Service Availability
By Market Size
Coef. P-val Coef. P-val Coef. P-val
All Markets
Percent poverty -0.028 0.489 0.016 0.716 -0.092 0.054
Medicaid
Hospital-level 0.012 0.126 -0.009 0.186 0.034 0.000 *
Market-level -0.004 0.875 -0.019 0.501 -0.011 0.688
Medicare
Hospital-level -0.031 0.000 * -0.033 0.000 * -0.015 0.008 *
Market-level -0.002 0.951 0.003 0.921 0.030 0.272
Race
Hispanic -0.016 0.049 * -0.015 0.109 -0.006 0.476
Black -0.013 0.111 -0.011 0.241 -0.007 0.471
Other -0.025 0.000 * -0.009 0.061 -0.028 0.001 *
Small Markets
Percent poverty -0.022 0.690 -0.041 0.580 0.004 0.943
Medicaid
Hospital-level 0.060 0.001 * 0.051 0.008 * 0.059 0.010 *
Market-level -0.045 0.131 -0.048 0.182 -0.066 0.182
Medicare
Hospital-level -0.011 0.295 -0.016 0.129 -0.001 0.900
Market-level -0.058 0.015 * -0.037 0.232 -0.037 0.185
Race
Hispanic -0.010 0.434 -0.001 0.945 -0.023 0.092
Black -0.003 0.833 0.016 0.435 -0.020 0.078
Other -0.024 0.000 * -0.007 0.189 -0.026 0.000 *
Large Markets
Percent poverty -0.079 0.168 0.013 0.839 -0.178 0.005 *
Medicaid
Hospital-level 0.008 0.313 -0.014 0.021 * 0.034 0.000 *
Market-level -0.021 0.591 -0.030 0.489 0.000 0.998
Medicare
Hospital-level -0.034 0.000 * -0.035 0.000 * -0.018 0.013 *
Market-level 0.020 0.531 0.018 0.600 0.057 0.069
Race
Hispanic -0.014 0.169 -0.018 0.122 0.003 0.789
Black -0.016 0.071 -0.018 0.077 -0.002 0.850
Other -0.025 0.076 -0.002 0.895 -0.039 0.007 *
All Services Profitable Services Unprofitable Services
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Table 5.5
The Effect of Local Uninsurance on Hospital Service Availability
Long difference, 2001 to 2005
Coef. P-val Coef. P-val Coef. P-val
All Markets
Uninsurance rate 0.016 0.689 -0.007 0.824 0.024 0.118
Medicaid
Hospital-level 3.279 0.107 2.843 0.028 * 0.436 0.614
Market-level -0.001 0.089 -0.001 0.135 0.000 0.206
Medicare
Hospital-level -0.386 0.508 -0.265 0.503 -0.121 0.667
Market-level 0.000 0.963 0.000 0.636 0.000 0.341
Small Markets
Uninsurance rate 0.065 0.455 0.017 0.790 0.048 0.161
Medicaid
Hospital-level 6.363 0.364 5.157 0.191 1.206 0.710
Market-level 0.000 0.979 0.000 0.920 0.000 0.875
Medicare
Hospital-level -0.050 0.951 0.124 0.813 -0.173 0.595
Market-level 0.001 0.250 0.000 0.451 0.000 0.060
Large Markets
Uninsurance rate 0.003 0.949 -0.012 0.750 0.015 0.393
Medicaid
Hospital-level 2.482 0.234 2.138 0.126 0.344 0.682
Market-level -0.001 0.177 0.000 0.400 0.000 0.169
Medicare
Hospital-level -1.063 0.400 -0.942 0.299 -0.121 0.830
Market-level -0.001 0.089 -0.001 0.083 0.000 0.773
Profitable Services Unprofitable ServicesAll Services
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Table 5.13
The Effects of Local Uninsurance rate on Market-level Hospital Utilization, 2001
By Market Size
Coef. P-val Coef. P-val Coef. P-val
All Markets
Uninsurance rate 0.005 0.361 -0.003 0.129 0.001 0.467
Medicaid rate 0.003 0.597 0.005 0.003 * 0.004 0.000 *
Medicare rate 0.014 0.001 * 0.009 0.000 * -0.001 0.338
Small Markets
Uninsurance rate -0.003 0.786 -0.003 0.478 0.000 0.839
Medicaid rate -0.001 0.837 0.005 0.016 * 0.004 0.003 *
Medicare rate 0.014 0.017 * 0.009 0.000 * -0.001 0.628
Large Markets
Uninsurance rate 0.001 0.900 -0.003 0.264 0.002 0.248
Medicaid rate 0.017 0.120 0.006 0.031 * 0.003 0.121
Medicare rate 0.017 0.019 * 0.007 0.000 * -0.001 0.488
Total admissions Proportion Medicare Proportion Medicaid
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Chapter 6: Summary and Conclusions 
 
 The previous two chapters explored the effects of the local uninsurance rates on 
various measures of health care access, utilization and outcomes for Medicare 
beneficiaries.  This chapter summarizes those results and draws some conclusions by 
bringing all parts of the analysis together.  It also discusses some of the caveats in 
interpreting the results of this work.  Finally, it will conclude with some directions for 
future research based on the conclusions of this work. 
 The goal of this research was to discover the market-level effects of local 
uninsurance on the availability and delivery of care to Medicare beneficiaries.  The 
conceptual framework pointed out a variety of ways in which the local uninsurance rate 
might affect the availability of care, the utilization of care and the ultimate outcomes for 
Medicare beneficiaries.  We tested the various hypotheses using data on hospital services 
and Medicare inpatient discharges in 100 sample MSAs.  Analyses were performed using 
both cross-sectional methods that relied on the variation in uninsurance across areas to 
identify the desired effects as well as panel data methods that focused on the changes in 
uninsurance within a market over time.  The results were in some cases consistent with 
expectations while in other cases they generated additional questions.  Some of the most 
interesting results were on the impact of Medicaid on the outcomes and use for Medicare 
beneficiaries which may lead to an additional line of questioning going forward.   
 The findings on the effects of the local uninsurance rate were relatively consistent 
with the hypotheses generated from our conceptual framework.  A higher local 
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uninsurance rate was found to be associated with the provision of fewer services by 
hospitals in the area and specifically of services considered to be unprofitable.  This 
result was consistent across small and large markets, but was stronger in magnitude in the 
smaller markets examined.  The result was diminished however in the presence of 
controls for race.  This result is consistent with the prediction that a lack of demand from 
uninsured individuals may result in a cutting back on shared elements of quality such as 
the availability of particular services.  The stronger result in small markets is also 
consistent with this idea as the smaller population would already result in lower demand 
in these markets.  The cut in unprofitable services specifically may be the result of lower 
demand for all services leaving less revenue to subsidize these less profitable service 
lines.  The selection of services that were analyzed, both profitable and unprofitable, was 
merely a subset of possible shared elements of quality.  These results are therefore taken 
as suggestive evidence that high uninsurance rates can result in reductions in shared 
elements of quality and that these reductions may come from among the less profitable 
service offerings or other elements of care.  Some evidence also emerges to indicate that 
uninsurance is related to increased provision of profitable services.  This suggests a 
differentiation response in small markets and deserves greater attention going forward.   
 One possible consequence of a reduction in the shared quality by a provider 
suggested by the conceptual framework was a compensating increase in the unique 
quality provided to a particular payer.  If a high uninsurance rate results in the need to cut 
back on certain elements of shared quality therefore, it is predicted that providers may 
compensate Medicare beneficiaries with increases in the unique quality provided to them.  
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It is difficult to know how to measure „unique quality‟ and our options are relatively 
limited by the use of discharge data only.  This analysis however looked at several 
measures of utilization to determine whether or not Medicare beneficiaries in areas with 
more uninsurance had higher utilization possibly indicating some compensation by 
providers for a drop in shared quality.  We found some evidence that this was the case.  
Medicare beneficiaries in areas with higher uninsurance rates were more likely to use the 
ICU and certain diagnostic services.  The results were not consistently significant across 
all measures and the significance dropped after including the race distribution.  These 
results seem to be consistent with the fact that as shared quality declines, utilization, as a 
proxy for unique quality, might increase.  It should be noted however that the elements of 
shared quality that were shown to decline and those utilization measures that appear to 
increase were not chosen to be complementary elements of care for any particular disease 
or condition.  These results are merely suggestive of more general trends in access and 
use.  
 The original question of interest was how local uninsurance rates affected the 
quality of care delivered to Medicare beneficiaries.  Outcomes of care, in this case 
mortality from a variety of specific procedures and conditions, were used as the ultimate 
measure of the quality of care.  As noted above, it was suggested that ultimate quality 
could be impacted in a number of ways, both positive and negative, by the presence of 
more uninsured individuals.  The analysis of the impact of local uninsurance rates on 
outcomes was designed to determine if, regardless of the mechanisms involved, the 
probability of death for Medicare beneficiaries was related to local uninsurance.  The 
117 
 
results were again mixed, but show some consistency with the mechanisms that have 
already been discussed.  Beneficiaries in smaller markets were more likely to see an 
increased probability of death, a negative spillover, in response to higher uninsurance 
rates although again the result was not consistent across all measures.  Those in larger 
markets were more likely to see a reduced probability of death, or a positive spillover, 
where there were more uninsured.   
While both negative and positive spillovers were plausible based on the 
conceptual framework, the mechanisms discussed above may aid in explaining the 
different results by market size.  In small markets, as was noted, the decrease in shared 
quality in the form of unprofitable services in response to more uninsured was nearly 
twice as big as that in large markets.  The increased probability of use was also slightly 
larger in small markets.  One possible explanation for the different outcomes results 
across markets would be that the effects on shared quality dominate the effects on 
outcomes in small markets.  In larger markets, the increases in utilization may better 
compensate for the shared quality loss and actually result in quality gains.  Again, the 
three sets of analyses are not truly equipped to derive these types of conclusions.  To do 
so, it would be important to choose elements of shared quality, utilization and outcomes 
that were specifically related to one another.  This was not the case here as the goal was 
to establish the more general responses to a high uninsurance rate rather than its impact 
on individuals with a specific condition. 
 The results of the effects of the uninsurance rate on access, use and outcomes 
based on cross-sectional analysis are at least relatively consistent with the conceptual 
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framework.  Because cross-sectional studies often face criticism based on the many 
unobservables that may be correlated with the outcomes of interest, this study also 
performed some analysis on the same questions using multiple years of data and panel 
data methods.  This analysis bases its conclusions regarding the effects of uninsurance on 
changes in the uninsurance rate over time within an individual MSA.  The results of these 
analyses show some consistencies with the cross-sectional results, but also reveal some 
differences.   
 One of the main differences in the panel data analysis was in the effect of the 
uninsurance rate on the provision of profitable and unprofitable services.  While the 
cross-sectional analysis showed consistently that hospitals in areas with higher 
uninsurance rates provided fewer unprofitable services, no comparable result emerged in 
the panel data analysis.  In fact, these models that estimated the change in the number of 
services at a given hospital over the study period as a function of the change in 
uninsurance at the market level were quite weak in general.  Very little of significance 
emerged in predicting the changes in service provision.  The changes in market-level 
characteristics that were used to predict changes in service provision occurred roughly 
concurrently.  It may be the case that it takes a hospital more time to respond to changes 
in market conditions with changes in their service offerings and thus, the lack of 
significant results. 
 The effects of changing uninsurance rates on the utilization of services by 
Medicare beneficiaries showed some consistency with the cross-sectional results in that 
beneficiaries in smaller markets experienced at least some increased use in markets with 
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larger uninsurance growth.  The results in larger markets however showed that Medicare 
beneficiaries in areas with a larger growth in uninsurance used less of certain elements of 
care.   This is the opposite of the results in the cross-sectional models.  These results 
however are not necessarily inconsistent with expectations either.  The reason that higher 
use was predicted in response to more uninsurance was due to a reduction in shared 
quality and therefore an incentive for providers to increase the unique quality provided to 
Medicare beneficiaries.  In this case, no evidence emerges of the reduction in shared 
quality and thus it should not be surprising to see no positive effects on use.  If the effects 
on shared quality are delayed in response to changes in uninsurance, so might be the 
associated changes in utilization.  The negative effects on use that emerge in these 
models may be the result of some unobserved characteristics of individuals in these 
markets that are correlated with higher uninsurance and a lower demand for care such as 
lower incomes or less supplemental coverage.   
 Interestingly enough, the results on outcomes are actually consistent in their 
direction with those of the cross-sectional models although somewhat weaker.  The 
results show again that smaller markets are more likely to see a negative spillover on 
outcomes, but in this case only one of the conditions is significant as opposed to two in 
the cross-sectional models without race controls and four in those controlling for race.  
Similarly, in larger markets, where the results are significant they show evidence of 
positive spillover effects of the uninsured to Medicare beneficiaries.  The relative 
consistency of the results on the ultimate outcomes of care suggest that while we have not 
completely established the mechanisms by which these spillovers occur, small markets 
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seem more likely to exhibit negative spillover effects and larger markets seem more 
likely to experience positive spillover effects.   
 The results on positive spillover effects, while initially somewhat surprising, are 
consistent with the conceptual framework if providers compensate Medicare beneficiaries 
for a reduction in shared quality by raising their unique quality of care in response to 
more uninsured.  Another explanation behind the positive spillover effects and one that 
might be more plausible in larger markets relates to the concepts of product 
differentiation.  The theory suggests that a provider can gain profit by gaining market 
share or limiting price competition.  In larger markets, a provider may choose to invest 
heavily in quality in one or more service areas in an effort to negotiate higher prices from 
payers.  They may be willing to sacrifice some market share in order to extract these 
higher prices.  This strategy may become more profitable as the insurance distribution 
becomes more diffuse and it becomes less profitable to compete for the individuals at the 
lower end of the distribution.  In small markets however, this approach is less likely to be 
possible because there may not be enough demand for the higher quality services to 
support the investment.  Thus, it is possible that a positive spillover effect could emerge 
as more hospitals in large markets are induced to use this strategy and quality rises for 
those willing to pay for it.     
 Altogether, the results on the market-level effects of uninsurance are somewhat 
mixed in their effects on availability of care, utilization and outcomes of care.  Hospitals 
in markets with more uninsured appear to offer fewer unprofitable services though this 
result disappears when examining within-market effects over time.  Some evidence exists 
121 
 
that hospitals in markets with more uninsured provide more profitable services however.  
Utilization by Medicare beneficiaries is somewhat higher in markets with more 
uninsured.  Over time however, large markets that show an increase in the uninsured 
show lower utilization of certain services.  Finally, Medicare beneficiaries in small 
markets with high or rising uninsurance seem to be somewhat more likely to die from at 
least two conditions.  In larger markets, beneficiaries in similar markets show a slightly 
lower probability of death.  While the results do not point to a serious or widespread 
negative externality being imposed on the Medicare population by the uninsured in their 
community, they do suggest that some spillover effects do exist.  This opens up a line of 
inquiry regarding other market-level effects of insurance.  In controlling for the effects of 
Medicaid in all of our analyses, for instance, several interesting results emerged.  These 
will be discussed further below.  
 Before discussing some avenues for future research, we must address some of the 
shortcomings of the present approach.  This study was limited by availability of local 
uninsurance rates to a sample of 100 relatively large MSAs.  As has been discussed, we 
would expect to see the spillover effects of a large uninsured population more 
prominently in a smaller market with fewer hospitals and thus fewer opportunities for 
differentiation.  Currently, data is being collected using the American Community Survey 
which will allow for data on uninsurance at a much finer level of geographic detail.  
Using this data to perform a similar analysis would be a natural extension of this work. 
 Despite attempting to control for many of the individual, hospital and market 
characteristics that might contribute to an individual‟s use of care or probability of death, 
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the use of discharge data did not allow for detailed information on individual income or 
supplemental insurance.  Assuming that Medicare beneficiaries in areas with more 
uninsured would be lower income and have less supplemental coverage, this could bias 
the results towards finding a negative spillover effect on use or mortality.  We did find 
some negative spillover effects on mortality in small markets, but the effects on use were 
generally positive.  The exception was the panel data approach in large markets which 
has been discussed. 
 One additional and important caveat with regard to this work is related to its 
interpretations.  The results here cannot be interpreted as evidence of a causal relationship 
between changes in the local uninsurance rate and the probability of death, the probability 
of use or the number of services provided by a given hospital.  These reduced form 
models attempt to establish the relationship between the variables of interest and to 
control for possible confounders of that relationship, but are not designed to produce 
causal estimates.   
 Despite its shortcomings, this work has produced some interesting results on the 
relationship between local uninsurance rates and various measures of access, utilization 
and outcomes.  Some of the most interesting results in this study however came as the 
unintended consequences of controlling for the proportion of Medicaid beneficiaries both 
within the market and within the hospital.  These proportions, specifically the hospital-
level Medicaid rate, showed a consistent negative relationship with outcomes across 
conditions, market sizes and analysis approaches.  In other words, the results strongly 
suggest that Medicare beneficiaries in hospitals with a higher proportion of Medicaid 
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discharges, have a higher probability of death from a variety of conditions.  The impacts 
on utilization are less consistent, but also tend be negative indicating less use by 
Medicare beneficiaries in hospitals with a high Medicaid burden.  Finally, the hospital 
Medicaid rate has a variety of significant impacts on the number of profitable and 
unprofitable services provided by hospitals.   
 The Medicaid results are particularly interesting because they point to another 
type of spillover effect that may be much stronger than the one from the uninsured.  
These results may be related to the additional subsidies that Medicaid provides to 
hospitals.  They may also be related to the provider payments from Medicaid which are 
known to be considerably lower than other payers.  This could result in spillovers with a 
similar set of mechanisms as those described for the uninsured.  The fact that Medicaid 
beneficiaries have insurance however, and are thus more likely to use care, may 
contribute to the strength of the effects.  As the two major public providers of insurance 
coverage in the US, the interactions between Medicaid and Medicare at the hospital level 
could be a very interesting area for future research.  This is particularly true in the context 
of current proposals for health reform, all of which include a substantial expansion of the 
Medicaid program.  If a strong Medicaid presence at the hospital level has significant 
negative spillovers on Medicare beneficiaries, it may be important to monitor these 
effects. 
 In conclusion, the results on the spillover effects of the uninsured are not so 
dramatic as to suggest that an intervention to cover the uninsured would result in 
significant gains for Medicare beneficiaries through this mechanism.  The results were 
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strong enough however to generate further interest in the market-level effects of health 
insurance and to pursue some extensions of this research.   
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